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ABSTRACT 
Research to date suggests that non-event-specific photo/narrative pairings produce higher 
false memory rates than do event-specific photos. The former differ from the latter in that 
the former provide relevant imagery but omit the specific event to be recalled, thereby 
promoting novel imaginings and increasing the likelihood of false memories. Two studies 
sought to determine which type of photograph constitutes a superior retrieval cue. The first 
study explored the role of how the photograph was framed upon presentation. Thirty-six 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions as follows: 1) narrative alone, 2) 
narrative plus photograph introduced as having been taken during the event, and 3) 
narrative plus photograph introduced as having been taking during the time period that the 
event took place. Participants were asked to provide as much descriptive detail about their 
memories for four events allegedly provided by their parents, one of which included a 
childhood hot-air balloon ride with a parent. They rated their memory (and quality thereof) 
for each event. Additionally, participants’ responses were rated as to the extent to which 
they constituted visual images or memories. The findings suggest that retrieval cues that 
favour the generation of a broader memory search model do play an important role in 
remembering. Both subjective and objective data demonstrated that the wider frame of 
reference of the “from that time period” condition led to higher false memory formation 
compared to the narrower frame of reference of the “during the event” condition. Overall, a 
photograph does not have to depict an event, nor even be viewed as being representative of 
the event, in order to exert a powerful influence on false memory formation. The second 
study examined the role of photograph content on false memory formation. Thirty-three 
participants were randomized to conditions as follows: 1) event-absent photograph, 2) non-
 v 
event specific photograph, 3) event-specific photograph. The event-absent and the event-
specific conditions yielded false memories at an equal frequency. These two groups also 
formed autobiographical beliefs in the event’s occurrence, with those in the doctored, 
event-specific photograph giving the highest ratings. Unfortunately, familiarity with the 
experimental design compromised the results of the second study.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
The topic of “false” or “implanted” memories has become ubiquitous in both the 
psychology and criminal justice literature. The impetus for research in this area was 
originally born out of concern over the general accuracy of memory - most infamously, 
the accuracy of childhood memories of sexual abuse recovered during therapy. The 
fallibility of memory stems from its underlying reconstructive nature, a concept first 
introduced by Bartlett (1932) and elaborated upon by Neisser (1976). When one perceives 
the world, the cognitive system does not preserve a snapshot representation of what is 
perceived. Rather, a mental representation of the present experience is constructed. There 
is a gap between present experience and subsequent remembering of same. Presumably, 
something is stored. It follows, then, that remembering involves a degree of reactivation 
of the previously activated network. However, this reactivation is not akin to reactivating 
the exact same pattern as that present at the time of original perception. Remembering is 
an act of creating a present reconstruction of past perceptual and reflective states. This 
reconstructive process is not without error, in that some reorganization inevitably takes 
place. We fill in gaps based on expectations and assumption about what likely occurred, 
as informed, for example, by our general schematic knowledge. This process also can 
involve the incorporation of entirely novel information such that the end product - the 
memory – may not be a true reflection of the original perceptive state. Memory’s 
susceptibility to change has given rise to a large body of research which can be divided 
into two main streams: that involving distorted true memories and that involving 
completely novel or implanted memories (i.e. false memories).     
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Distortion of True Memories 
Prior research demonstrates that details within memories for true events can be 
altered. In fact, even “flashbulb memories” (defined as vividly detailed memories of the 
circumstances under which one first experienced a significant and emotionally 
meaningful public or personal event; e.g., Challenger space shuttle disaster, 9/11 terrorist 
attacks) often show inaccuracies as do “ordinary” memories (e.g. Neisser & Harsch, 
1992, Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Nevertheless, there are elements of flashbulb memories 
that are more likely to be accurate, such as contextual details about the event. 
As such, even the most vividly experienced of memories are susceptible to decay 
and interference effects. Regarding the decay theory of memory, it is proposed that 
memory fades over time such that the original memory trace slowly disintegrates and is 
increasingly less available for retrieval as a factor of time. According to Ebbinghaus’ 
classic research, the half-life of human memory is approximately one hour, absent regular 
rehearsal (Ebbinghaus, Ruger & Bussenius, 1913). Another mechanism by which 
memory can be altered is through interference. Interference theory suggests that new 
information interacts with information formerly encoded such that learning is impaired. 
Interference can be either proactive or retroactive (Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924). The 
former involves the forgetting of new information due to information provided before the 
target event has occurred (e.g. remembering an event one way despite the provision of 
new information that refutes the original memory), whereas the latter involves forgetting 
due to information provided after the target event has occurred. In this case, the new (i.e. 
post-event information) may merge and integrate with the original memory and alter or 
displace it, increasing the likelihood that original memory being recalled will contain 
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inaccurate information.  
When post-event information is inaccurate and relates to the original event, it is 
termed “post-event misinformation”. When individuals incorporate the new 
misinformation into their recall for the original event, this is termed the “misinformation 
effect” (Wright, Self, and Justice, 2000; Loftus, 2007). In Loftus and Palmer’s (1974) 
seminal misinformation study, participants viewed videotapes of car accidents and 
estimated the speed with which the vehicles were traveling at impact. Speed estimates 
were 20% higher when a strong verb such as “crashed” was presented while answering 
questions after viewing the videotape, contrasted with weak verbs such as “contacted”. 
Furthermore, when retested a week later, those questioned with “smashed” were more 
than twice as likely to report seeing a broken headlight, even though there was no broken 
headlight in the videotape.      
The pernicious effects of misinformation have been repeatedly demonstrated in 
the literature over the years (Loftus, 2007). Although it has been suggested that peripheral 
details are easier to alter (Heath & Erickson, 1998), other studies have shown that it is 
possible to alter memory for a central detail as well (Okado & Stark, 2005).   
Creation of Entirely False Memories 
However important in helping elucidate the mechanisms of what makes memory 
fallible, research examining the distortion of true memories does not address the 
fabrication of completely novel memories (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). As noted above, 
distortion of true memories can occur naturally through reconstructive remembering 
processes or can be induced. These processes involve the manipulation of details, 
whereas the overall integrity of the event remains intact. As such, these memories are 
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grounded in autobiographical reality, whereas false memories are not. The creation of 
false memories involves a significantly greater degree of distortion, which can carry 
consequences with greater implications. 
Research into false memories was reinvigorated by the controversy over 
recovered memories of alleged childhood sexual abuse that were purportedly recovered 
during therapy, that appeared to in fact never have occurred. In some cases, individuals 
who had initially reported recovered memories of abuse following psychotherapy later 
withdrew their accusations (Schacter, 2001). Research examining the experiences of these 
individuals noted that coming to form this false memory resulted in an identity shift such 
that individuals came to partly define themselves survivors of childhood sexual abuse 
(Lief & Fetkewitz, 1995). The subsequent realization that what had appeared to be an 
autobiographical fact was actually untrue, especially one of such significance, not 
surprisingly contributed to distress in many of those who retracted their abuse memory 
claims. Moreover, the gap between the initial accusation and the withdrawal of the same 
led to significant collateral damage in many cases (legal cases, damaged reputations and 
careers of those falsely accused, destruction of families, and the like). That such 
significant and life-altering memory distortions appeared to be possible prompted 
researchers to examine the processes by which such claims could develop (de Riviera, 
1997) as well as how they then came to be retracted (Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002).  
Ethical considerations prohibit the experimental examination of how false 
memories of childhood sexual abuse can be formed. However, Loftus & Pickrell (1995) 
are credited with performing the first study to address this phenomenon, using the false 
event of being lost in a shopping mall as a child. To do this, the researchers presented 
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participants with 4 narratives describing events from their early childhood, all of which 
were allegedly provided by the participants’ relatives (i.e. parents or older siblings). 
Three of these events were true, whereas one was a false narrative about how the 
participant had been lost in a shopping mall. Based on an interview with the relatives, a 
booklet of events was generated and sent to participants, who were asked to write as 
much as they could remember about each event description. Participants were then 
interviewed twice. At the conclusion of the second interview, 29% of participants fully or 
partially remembered having experienced this event (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).  
This methodological approach has since been termed the “familial-informant 
false-narrative procedure” (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004), the 
‘implantation procedure’ (Otgaar, Candel, Merkelbach & Wade, 2009), or more 
colloquially the “lost in the shopping mall paradigm,” and has been employed in 
numerous studies and with a large variety of target false events. Strange, Gerrie and 
Garry (2005) found that collapsing across nine studies using false narratives alone, 33% 
of adults came to remember aspects of a suggested false event.  
False Narratives 
Initial research into false memory formation has relied on the use of false 
narratives allegedly provided by others (i.e. parents, relatives) to study how this 
phenomenon occurs. Although clearly a powerful suggestive medium, a potential 
criticism of using narratives is that individuals perceive, and thus remember, events 
idiosyncratically. As such, they will describe them as occurring from their own 
perspective, which dictates how and what aspects of the event are remembered (Ross, 
1997). Another individual present at the same time may describe the very same event 
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differently. As French, Sutherland, and Garry (2006) aptly summarize: “What is 
remembered does not equal what happened, and will vary for each person” (pp. 6). They 
reported that siblings who were asked to independently recall details of a specific 
common event overlapped on details only 24.7% of the time, thereby suggesting that the 
remaining 75.3% from each perspective contained details that differed purportedly to 
varying degrees.   
As such, narratives are not an objective representation of fact. This can lead to 
their authenticity being questioned, even in circumstances where the event in question is 
actually true. Photographs, on the other hand, are rarely disputed. Even when we are 
increasingly more aware of imaging software programs that can alter photographs, the 
authenticity of our family photographs is rarely questioned - we just assume that they are 
the real thing and the event depicted in the photo did in fact occur (Strange et al., 2005). 
False Photographs 
Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) extended the false memory research to 
study the influence of doctored photographs, positing that such photographs may be more 
effective in altering memory because of the trust placed therein as compared to a verbal 
account. They argue that family photographs constitute compelling evidence that the 
events depicted therein actually occurred. Furthermore, a photograph is full of rich 
perceptual details, which may act as cues for remembering the event (Lindsay et al., 
2004). In order to test this, Wade et al. (2002) solicited four true photographs from 
participants’ family, and doctored one of them to depict the participant with a parent in a 
hot air balloon. Participants were interviewed three times over the course of a week and 
shown the photographs each time. They were encouraged to try to remember the events, 
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and guided imagery and context reinstatement were employed to assist participants when 
they experienced difficulty remembering. At the conclusion of the third interview, 20% of 
participants formed complete memories of the false event and 33% formed images alone 
(i.e. descriptions of images associated with the event that the participant did not appear to 
experience as memories; Wade et al., 2002). It is notable that Loftus and Pickrell’s (1995) 
definition of “partial” versus “full” remembering was very limited, and thus does not 
allow for a precise comparison with Wade et al. (2002). However, it appears that 50% of  
Wade et al.’s (2002) participants formed images or memories for the false event as 
compared to 29% of Loftus and Pickrell’s (1995). This shows that doctored photographs 
constitute a powerful suggestive cue – one that may appear to be superior to narratives. 
False Narratives Versus False Photographs 
Although Wade et al.’s (2002) results suggest that photographs may be more 
effective at promoting false memories than are narratives, such a conclusion requires a 
direct comparison of the two media. In order to do so, it is necessary to somehow equate 
the two suggestive media, which is exactly what Garry and Wade (2005) attempted. 
Using the hot-air balloon ride target event, the researchers gave half of their participants a 
narrative describing the event whereas the second half received a photograph depicting 
the event. At the conclusion of three interviews, approximately 32% of participants in the 
photograph condition were judged as having a memory for the event and approximately 
18% formed images alone. In the narrative condition, approximately 40% of participants 
were judged as having a memory for the event and approximately 42% formed images 
alone. Garry and Wade (2005) originally reported their findings as a composite of images 
plus memories, which would suggest a larger difference in total false information 
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generated when comparing photographs to narratives (50% versus 82% respectively). 
Although a larger percentage of false memory formation occurred in the narrative 
condition as compared to the photograph condition, the difference (40% versus 32%) is 
not as practically meaningful. Nevertheless, it is striking that the percentage of imagery 
formation found in the narrative condition was double the percentage of imagery 
formation found in the photograph condition.  
To explain the inconsistency of these finding with Wade et al.’s (2002) theoretical 
assertion that photographs trump narratives due to their vivid visual characteristics, Garry 
and Wade (2005) proposed that photographs impose constraints on the development of 
the type of fluent processing associated with remembering relative to narratives. The 
ambiguity of narratives allows individuals to generate their own details to flesh out their 
mental image for an event, whereas photographs limit the flexibility to freely imagine 
idiosyncratic details. Certain details depicted in the photograph may limit the recollection 
of other details, as well as the way in which the details depicted can be visualized, owing 
to the need to maintain consistency with the details as depicted in the photo. As such, 
photos may impose stronger limitations on finding matching information in memory, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that a false event will be rejected. 
True Photographs as Assistive Cues 
However, deeming all photographs to be more memory-constraining as compared 
to narratives may be premature. As Strange et al (2005) point out, most individuals would 
not likely encounter a doctored photograph showing them engaging in something that 
they never did or being somewhere they had never been. Indeed, this may be why 
individuals continue to trust family photos, despite the awareness that doctoring is 
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possible. This raises the question, is it necessary to alter or otherwise falsify a photograph 
such that it depicts a specific target event in order for it to be an influential agent of false 
memory creation? After all, individuals sometimes turn to picture evidence for cues to 
help themselves remember - even in the absence of an exact photograph depicting the 
event to be remembered. Moreover, Lindsay et al (2004) observed that some memory 
recovery techniques encourage individuals to consult family photo albums to aid in 
recalling unremembered childhood events.  
Lindsay et al. (2004) conducted a study to explore whether individuals would be 
more likely to endorse memory for a false event if they were shown a relevant picture to 
assist in their recall. In order to encourage participants to remember a false event, the 
authors employed the standard narrative paradigm described above with some 
modifications. First, the target false event was a childhood prank wherein participants 
allegedly got into trouble for having put a toy in their teacher’s desk, which is arguably a 
more common  (and likely more believable) event than is a hot air balloon ride. Second, 
participants were interviewed two times instead of three. Finally, all participants were 
presented with three narratives (two true and one false). However, one half of the 
participants also received a class photograph from the time period that the events were 
drawn from purportedly to help them remember. The results showed that 65.2% of 
participants in the narrative plus photograph condition were judged as having memories 
and 13% were judged as having images. Of those in the narrative alone condition, 22.7% 
were judged as having memories and 27% were judged as having images. Lindsay et al. 
(2004) argued the false narrative provides the suggestion whereas the photograph 
provides raw materials, that is, the visual details and images that can be pieced together to 
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form a false memory. Accordingly, not only can photographs operate as powerful 
facilitative devices, this study provides compelling evidence that they do not necessarily 
need to depict the target event to exert their influence in promoting false memories 
(Strange et al., 2005).  
The idea that understanding information contained within a narrative can be 
enhanced by also presenting a photograph was first introduced by Bransford & Johnson 
(1972). In their study, they presented all participants with a story that was quite abstract 
and senseless, and half received a photograph to accompany the story. Those who heard 
only the story reported lower comprehension and remembered less of the story content. 
Those who received the accompanying photograph, on the other hand, reported higher 
comprehension ratings and remembered more of the story. The authors suggested that the 
photograph helped the participants create a context within which to comprehend the story. 
A necessary proviso is that in order to be helpful as comprehension aides, pictures must 
be relevant and related to the narrative, otherwise recall is curtailed (Harp & Mayer, 
1997). 
Common Factor: The Self 
Therefore, despite the debate regarding their relative superiority, narratives, true 
photographs and doctored photographs all have emerged as powerful retrieval cues (i.e. 
prompts used to induce the retrieval of memory) for inducing false memories. The 
manner in which these media have been employed in the literature thus far has been fairly 
consistent, thereby facilitating the above-mentioned comparisons between them in order 
to determine which results in the highest false memory formation rate. In all studies to 
date, constant factors include: 1) all participants being told that events (narratives and/or 
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photographs) were provided by the participants’ parents; 2) the use of guided imagery to 
help promote remembering; 3) the normalization of forgetting, with the rationale that one 
has not thought of the events presented in a very long time; and relatedly, 4) the 
development of the expectation that memories can be retrieved (by virtue of the previous 
two points).  The respective roles of these factors in false memory formation have been 
empirically demonstrated. Scoboria, Wysman, and Otgaar (2012) have highlighted the 
importance of source credibility as a critical component of false belief formation. 
Moreover, imagination and guided imagery are components of “repeated elicitation of the 
content” (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002), a processes routinely employed to facilitate 
“remembering” in the false memory literature. These strategies, when employed in 
combination with factors that increase autobiographical belief (prevalence information, 
forgetting rationale; Scoboria et al; 2006), augment the likelihood that false memories 
will be formed (e.g. Hyman & Pentland, 1996), and thereby constitute a “recipe” for false 
memory formation. 
Although each type of suggestive medium is distinct from the others, a common 
factor among all three is the presence of some kind of self-relevant detail. In the literature 
to date, one key detail is the participant themselves, which is arguably the most influential 
self-relevant detail. There is consensus in the literature about the strong relationship 
between the self and autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Moreover, the inherent self-referential nature of autobiographical memories is a key 
feature in distinguishing these types of memories from other types of memory and long-
term knowledge stores (Brewer, 1986). In terms of the suggestive media used in false 
memory research to date, the subject is referenced when a false event is presented in 
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narrative form and when either photograph type is used, the subject is visually depicted 
therein.  
Self-Relevant Details in Narratives 
The impact of self-relevant details within the false memory context was first 
investigated by Desjardins and Scoboria (2007). The authors considered the wide 
variability of false memory formation rates in the literature, and posited that in addition to 
the influence of event plausibility (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin & Gabbay, 2006), the widely 
varying number and type of details contained in narratives across studies likely played a 
role as well. Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) argued that in some studies, the narratives 
contained information idiosyncratic to the participant (e.g., the name of the participant’s 
hometown, name of a family member), while in other studies, such self-relevant details 
were absent. They reported that studies which included self-relevant details tended to 
evidence higher false memory formation rates (about 70%)  vs. lower memory rates 
(about 33%) in other false memory studies cited previously. Accordingly, Desjardins and 
Scoboria (2007) hypothesized that the presence of self-relevant details influence false 
memory formation.  
 To examine this hypothesis, Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) employed Garry and 
Wade’s (2005) methodology, and Lindsay et al.’s (2004) false narrative. The latter was 
tailored to vary the inclusion of self-relevant details (“your friend Suzy”, versus “a 
friend”), specific details (defined as “elements of the narrative that could be removed 
without altering the general script;” which included “revolting slime toy” versus “a toy”), 
both, or neither. They found that the inclusion of self-relevant information produced 
higher rates of memories or memory-like images (68.2%) as compared to suggestions that 
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did not include such information (36.4%). Furthermore, subjective memory ratings were 
significantly greater when self-relevant information was included in false narratives. 
There was no effect found for the inclusion of highly specific details.  
 A possible explanation for these findings is that self-relevant details serve to 
promote fluency of processing, a concept related to Jacoby and Dallas’ (1981) 
attributional view of memory and later elaborated by Whittlesea’s (1993) fluency 
attribution hypothesis. According to this view, fluent (i.e. rapid) processing of stimuli is 
misinterpreted as familiarity that indicates having experienced said stimulus in the past. 
This theory was later modified to posit that it is surprising fluency of processing that 
elicits feelings of familiarity. These feelings result from a discrepancy between expected 
versus experienced processing fluency (discrepancy attribution hypothesis; Whittlesea & 
Williams, 1998). Therefore, by promoting feelings of familiarity which become 
misattributed to the false event, self-relevant details may facilitate the endorsement of the 
false event. The absence of self-relevant details provides sufficient latitude for individuals 
to elaborate on the stimulus provided. However, given that fluency of processing is less 
likely to occur under such conditions, research to date suggests that false memory 
formation rates are comparatively not as high (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007).  
Self-Relevant Details in Photographs 
 Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria (2012) extended the work by Desjardins and 
Scoboria (2007) by exploring the effects of fluency promoting and fluency inhibiting 
details on memories when presented in doctored photographs. Employing the same 
general method, a doctored photograph was created to include fluency-promoting details, 
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fluency-impeding details, both, or neither. The goal was to determine which combination 
of photographic details created an optimal environment to foster false memory formation  
 In the study, parents of participants provided childhood photographs, and one 
photograph was used to create an image of the participant posing in a hot air balloon with 
one of their parents. The image of the hot air balloon was held constant, and fluency 
promotion was manipulated by either clearly showing the participant and their parent (a 
fluency promoting detail) or by obscuring them from view using a lens-flare effect. 
Fluency impediment was manipulated by either having a neutral background or a 
background with a lighthouse among some shrubs (an impeding detail).  The results 
revealed that including fluency promoting details, while omitting fluency impeding 
details (e.g. clear view of participant and parent while omitting the lighthouse in the 
background), created a more optimal environment for false memory formation, in that the 
highest subjective memory ratings were found in this condition. Fluency-promotion alone 
showed no direct influence on memories by way of main effects, in contrast to Desjardins 
and Scoboria’s (2007) findings as outlined above.  
 Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria (2012) proposed that that details presented in 
photographs are more conspicuous (as compared to narratives), and thus harder to dismiss 
or attenuate when trying to remember an event. Accordingly, fluency promoting details 
may have a lesser effect when presented in a photographic medium than in a narrative 
medium. For example, when a person hears “[you] and [your mother] in a hot air 
balloon”, [your mother], being a self-relevant detail, is fluency promoting, and they can 
imagine their mother in many different ways. When shown a picture of themselves and 
their mother in a hot air balloon, the picture of the mother may be taken from an angle 
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that is unfamiliar, or the mother may be dressed in a way that is not familiar to the 
individual. Thus, the photographically depicted fluency-promoting detail loses some of its 
power in that it restricts what is searched for in memory to the specific details depicted 
(e.g. memories of “mom with that particular haircut, wearing that outfit,” as opposed to 
just “mom”).  
Metacognitive Operations Governing Acceptance and Rejection of Events  
 The idea that a fluency promoting detail is less powerful when presented in 
photograph versus narrative form may be more of a contextual artifact than a feature of 
the detail itself. That is to say, doctored photographs and false narratives both imply a 
very specific context in which the fluency promoting detail is presented (i.e. the event 
occurred as described and should thus be remembered in this manner). False narratives, 
however, allow more room for cognitive maneuvering where the details are concerned 
than do doctored photographs. In doing so, false narratives permit more contextual 
flexibility such that fluency promoting details can exert greater power. The individual 
trying to recall the event is thus afforded greater latitude to use those fluency promoting 
details as a springboard to generating additional fluency promoting details with which to 
generate a mental product suitable enough to be labeled as a memory. The doctored 
photographs used in studies to date, on the other hand, provide a visual representation of 
the suggested event. If the photograph is intended to be accepted as an accurate 
representation of the event - which it is - then the implied expectation is that the event 
should be remembered as depicted, and that each detail of the photograph should be 
remembered as depicted. If any memory that happens to be elicited in response to the 
photo cue fails to meet these strict exclusion criteria, the event is less likely to be 
 16 
accepted as true. Put another way, the threshold for event acceptance is higher such that 
the end result is an inability to make a decision about the occurrence of the event (i.e. 
neither acceptance nor rejection). 
Metacognitive Beliefs 
 Judgments about the past occurrence of an event involve a complex metacognitive 
decision-making process which Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) proposed is comprised of two 
factors: 1) information available about the event at the moment of making a decision 
about its occurrence; and 2) metacognitive beliefs that individuals hold regarding 
memory. Considering the first factor using the hot air balloon ride event, examples of 
information held by individuals include knowledge of having gone to amusement parks as 
a child, having gone on scary rides, having been with their parents during activities done 
when young, and the like. Referencing the second factor, individuals hold certain beliefs 
about memory, such as that memories fade over time (Cornoldi, 1998), that it is not 
possible to remember events that occurred very early in life, that events experienced in 
life are encoded and stored somewhere in memory, that encoded information can be 
retrieved with some effort, and that memory retrieval can be assisted with cues. 
 Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) contend that determining whether an event occurred 
involves attempting to generate a mental representation, which is then evaluated 
according to one’s metacognitive beliefs about the qualitative aspects of memories (i.e. 
contextual, semantic, affective, perceptual, and information about cognitive operations; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay, 1993). They also include less specific qualities such as 
familiarity and specificity (Johsnon, Raye, Mitchell, & Ankudowich, 2011). The degree 
to which the mental product measures up to these criteria determines whether or not it 
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will be deemed to be a memory. The threshold for this judgment process is flexible, 
which is advantageous as it allows for the retrieval of memories encoded at various levels 
of quality and specificity. If the criteria were rigid, many memories would be lost to us 
given that attempts to remember them could never satisfy very strict threshold criteria. 
However, a byproduct of this flexibility is the probability of false memories occurring, as 
will be discussed in greater depth below. 
 The discussion above concerns processes that occur when some kind of event-
consistent mental product is generated. Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) propose that when an 
adequate mental product cannot be generated, people must decide whether the absence of 
memory is diagnostic of the event not having occurred (Strack & Bless, 1994). This 
occurs via inference, and is based on at least three metacognitive beliefs; 1) the more time 
that has elapsed between encoding and retrieval increases the likelihood of forgetting, so 
not having a sufficiently good mental product in such a case would not be diagnostic of 
non-occurrence; 2) events that occurred early in life (i.e. before the offset of childhood 
amnesia) also are likely to be forgotten; and 3) the more distinctive the event, the more 
likely it is to be remembered, whereas less distinctive events are less likely to be 
remembered. Therefore, not remembering an event that is deemed to be rare or unusual in 
some way may suggest that the event did not actually occur.  
 Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) contend that if lack of memory is considered to be 
diagnostic of the event not having occurred, then the decision that the event did not occur 
can be made without needing to consider any further information. If, on the other hand, 
lack of memory is not diagnostic of non-occurrence, the decision about whether or not the 
event occurred must take into consideration other information. This process involves the 
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evaluation of any additional available information, such as information that has been 
provided to aid in decision making (i.e. information provided by an experimenter in a 
study or by a family member).   
 Thus, new information can alter both the way in which an event is remembered, as 
well as impact the final decision regarding event occurrence - a key step in the creation of 
false autobiographical beliefs (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & 
Relyea, 2004).  In the case of infrequent events (e.g. hot air balloon rides), individuals 
might judge the event as having a low likelihood of being true. However, increasing the 
perception of the plausibility of an event (e.g., through the provision of prevalence 
information; Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria et al. 2006) also should increase 
belief in the event having occurred, as has been empirically demonstrated (see Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002 for a review).  
Autobiographical Beliefs 
 Once a false autobiographical belief has been created, Mazzoni and Kirsch propose 
that proceeding to the development of a false memory involves two factors acting in 
concert: 1) changes in the threshold criterion according to which mental products are 
evaluated as to the degree to which they constitute a memory, and 2) the development of 
higher quality mental products related to the target event. Both factors are critical in 
producing a decision that one remembers an event. The key role that beliefs play is that 
they influence the threshold criterion. As noted above, this threshold is flexible and can 
be reduced if belief in the event is increased. This reduction in the threshold enhances the 
likelihood that mental products will be deemed as good enough to constitute memories. 
Enhancing the quality of mental products can be accomplished via “repeated elicitation of 
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the content” (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002) which occurs during imagination, context-
reinstatement, and guided imagery - all processes routinely employed to facilitate 
“remembering” in the false memory literature. These methods, when employed in 
combination with factors that increase belief (prevalence information, forgetting 
rationale; Scoboria et al; 2006), augment the likelihood that false memories will be 
formed (e.g. Hyman & Pentland, 1996).          
 To return to the findings of Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria (2012), the vivid and 
specific retrieval cue presented (i.e. the doctored photograph containing the fluency-
promoting details) may have created a highly stringent criterion against which to compare 
the mental products generated in response to it. In other words, the threshold for event 
acceptance was made to be higher by this particular photograph. The fluency-promoting 
details in this case are less powerful as they limit the ability to freely imagine an event 
and enhance the quality of the mental product generated in response to the cue. As such, 
according to the Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) model, the provision of information (i.e. that 
photographs were provided by parents, the rationale normalizing the forgetting of 
childhood events, and the like) may have sufficiently raised belief such that the event was 
not rejected. However, the two factors that might translate elevated false belief into false 
memory (decreasing threshold criterion and/or developing higher quality mental 
products) may not have occurred optimally. 
Metacognitive Monitoring Processes and The Self 
 Overall, the process of accessing, retrieving and evaluating information obtained 
from an autobiographical memory search depends on a series of metacognitive 
monitoring processes. These processes have been studied extensively in the literature 
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(e.g. Burgess & Shallice 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; Johnson et al., 1993; 
Johnson et al., 2011). 
 Additionally, as mentioned above, the importance of the relationship between 
autobiographical memory and the self is endorsed by a number of researchers in the area 
of autobiographical memory. Two theories that encompass both concepts (metacognitive 
monitoring processes and the self) in relation to one another are self-schema theory 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and source monitoring theory (Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). Each theory, as well as the idiosyncratic ways in which retrieval cues 
contribute to false memory formation, within each, will be discussed in turn. 
Self-Schema Theory         
 Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) self-schema theory is a model adapted from 
the work of Markus and Ruvolo (1989) and Markus and Nurius (1986), which introduces 
the concept of a self-memory system (SMS) in which autobiographical memory is 
constructed. The SMS is comprised of an autobiographical knowledge base (a multilevel 
store of information about the self; see below for further detail) as well as the working 
self concept. Referencing the latter, the authors propose that long-term memory 
representations of different aspects of the “self’ form into sets of self-schemas. Only a 
subset of these schemas are active at any given time. Currently active schemas comprise 
the working self, which is a constantly changing view of the self and what it may become. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) reference Higgins’ (1987) theory of the self which 
posits that there are three domains of the self: 1) the actual self (representations of 
attributes that one actually possesses); 2) the ideal self (representations of attributes one 
would like to possess); and 3) the ought-self (representations of attributes one thinks one 
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should possess). Discrepancies between these three dimensions of the self give rise to 
negative emotional experiences.  Higgins (1987) emphasized that memories which 
suggest discrepancies between the actual self and the ought and ideal selves are the most 
affect-laden, and are accompanied motivation to reduce this negative affect. The central 
goal of the working self is to reduce discrepancies, and thus plays a critical role in the 
encoding of autobiographical knowledge and the construction of memories during 
remembering. The cues representing the innocuous false events employed in the literature 
do not contribute to the same intense and destabilizing affective states associated with 
more fundamental discrepancies (e.g. discrepant morals and values). However, the 
features of self-discrepancy theory espoused by the SMS suggest that a sufficient degree 
of intrapersonal tension and discomfort is triggered when an individual is presented with 
a cue suggestive of an autobiographical event that they do not immediately remember. 
This negative affect, in turn, gives rise to a motivation to reduce the discrepancy.    
 The discrepancy-reducing goal of the working self functions as a negative 
feedback mechanism, complete with an input, a standard for comparison, and output 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996). If a discrepancy is detected between the input and the 
standard, the output is modified accordingly so as to reduce this discrepancy and 
associated negative feelings. Two ways in which this modification is accomplished are 
attempts at justification (labeling the input that is resulting in these dissonant feelings as 
an exception to the norm) or attempts at outweighing (finding multiple examples of 
consonant autobiographical events so that the single dissonant input is outweighed). This 
is consistent with Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that 
contradicting thoughts or beliefs compel the mind to acquire or invent new thoughts or 
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beliefs, or to modify existing ones, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance therein 
(Festinger, 1957).         
 The goals of the working self are posited to play a key role in regulating cognitive 
stability. They are also integral in both the encoding and the retrieval of autobiographical 
knowledge, which is classified into three broad levels in Conway’s model: lifetime 
periods, general events (which are further divided into repeated events and specific 
events), and event-specific knowledge (ESK; see Fig. 1).      
 These knowledge levels are organized in a hierarchical fashion (Barsalou, 1988). 
For example, various details within ESK (i.e. wedding dress, reciting vows, signing a 
marriage license) are organized as part of a specific general event (i.e. wedding day), 
which is in turn part of a lifetime period (e.g. graduate school versus entry into 
professional life). When a stable pattern of activation occurs across each of these 
autobiographical knowledge areas, this is termed an autobiographical memory. The three 
levels of autobiographical knowledge moderate the construction of autobiographical 
memories. These levels limit which area of the knowledge base a given cue can access. 
Central control processes that moderate access to and output from the autobiographical 
knowledge base also limit autobiographical memory construction. This is done in 
accordance with the working self concept’s goal of maintaining cognitive consonance. In 
order to do so, the working self acts as a “gate keeper” of sorts by dictating the generation 
of memory retrieval models with specific parameters which either facilitate or impede 
access to the autobiographical knowledge base. So, for example, if an externally-
presented retrieval cue is dissonant with current goals of the self (i.e. does not “fit” into 
the memory repertoire of an individual) then the retrieval model generated will impede 
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access to the autobiographical knowledge base, and the likelihood of the successful 
retrieval of an autobiographical memory product is decreased.  
 Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) originally conceptualized the Self-Memory 
System (SMS) as being comprised of the autobiographical memory base and the working 
self concept. The theory was later modified to include an integrated “long term self”, 
which includes the autobiographical knowledge base and the “conceptual self” (Conway, 
Singer & Tagini, 2004). The latter can be thought of as a collection of abstract versions of 
the self in the context of different episodic experiences, as well as versions of possible 
selves (ostensibly influenced by personal desires for the self as well as societal influences 
on what the self should be). Despite this adjustment to the SMS, the basic components are 
nevertheless the same. Namely, the working self (a currently active subset of self-
schemas) initiates a retrieval model to access the autobiographical knowledge base 
(which is now housed in the new “long term self”), doing so self”), doing so according to 
a set of goals, the most prominent of which is to reduce discrepancies between the 
possible selves (which is a component of the new “conceptual self”).    
 As such, the SMS can be conceptualized as a central control centre which 
generates patterns of activation which represent specific memories, either through 
generative or direct retrieval (Conway, 1996). The first search strategy (generative 
retrieval) consists of a iterative three stage process as follows: 1) elaboration of a memory 
search cue and the establishment of verification criteria; 2) matching the cue to patterns 
of activation in the autobiographical knowledge base (i.e. memories); and 3) accessed 
memories are compared to the verification criteria wherein only knowledge that is not 
prohibited by working self goals remains. This process can occur in cycles until the  
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Figure 1. Schematic Representation of Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000)  
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verification criteria are satisfied, and can be conceptualized as a discrepancy-reducing 
negative feedback loop (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The verification criteria thus 
serve as a metacognitive monitoring process that evaluates the retrieval products to 
ensure that the requisite threshold has been met in order to deem the product to be a 
memory.             
 This elaborate retrieval process can be by-passed if a cue is sufficient to elicit a 
stable pattern of activation in the autobiographical knowledge base at the level of ESK 
(see white arrow, Fig. 1). The stable pattern of activation suggests congruence with the 
autobiographical knowledge base. As such, the working self concept does not need to 
engage in the discrepancy-reducing cue-elaboration phase of generated retrieval, and a 
less onerous direct search strategy can be employed instead. According to Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000), ESK is most strongly associated with imagery. Moreover, its 
activation may trigger autonoetic consciousness (a sense of recollectively experiencing 
the past or “mental time travel”) which is a key component in episodic remembering 
(Tulving, 1983) and gives the individual that sense of rapidly activated information about 
the qualitative characteristics of a retrieval product. According to this logic then, if such a 
highly specific cue designed to access the autobiographical knowledge base and elicit an 
activation pattern at its most detailed level (i.e. ESK) fails to induce imagery or 
autonoetic processing where such induction is clearly expected, then it stands to reason 
that such a failure results in the termination of the retrieval process and the memory 
search is deemed to have failed. In other words, cues designed to access ESK are held to 
the highest congruence standard: either a stable pattern of activation must occur, or the 
working self-concept “gate keeper” prohibits access to the autobiographical knowledge 
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base. Moreover, the formation of an activation pattern in the first place is quite tenuous, 
depends on the specificity of the cue, and how that cue is processed with reference to its 
ability to activate ESK (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).     
 Given the framework of the SMS model and its retrieval processes, what 
constitutes the “ideal” retrieval cue? Although cues that tap into the autobiographical 
knowledge base at the level of ESK may seem like optimal choices for retrieving a 
memory, Conway (1996) states that general events are actually the preferred level of 
entry into the knowledge base when attempting to bring about recall of an event. Entry at 
this level has the advantage of allowing the individual to access a collection of candidate 
general events rather than be limited to one. Moreover, although individuals have “fast 
access” to lifetime period and general event knowledge (Burgess & Shallice, 2000), when 
individuals are given a retrieval cue and prompted to retrieve a memory, the retrieval 
model generated by the working self is such that initial retrieval attempts are made at the 
level of general event knowledge (see black arrow, Fig. 1).    
 Conversely, cues that are designed to access autobiographical knowledge at the 
level of ESK limit the individual in that spreading activation moves from that specific 
point in ESK and activates a single general event and then a single lifetime period. For 
example, when attempting to cue an individual to retrieve a memory of taking a hot air 
balloon ride at an amusement park at the age of six, a cue at the ESK level might be to 
show a picture of the specific hot air balloon, which then may activate the single general 
event (going on a hot air balloon ride) situated within a single lifetime period (six years of 
age). This works well if the specific ESK cue hits the mark, as a stable activation pattern 
will be established that will then be linked into the working self goal structure and result 
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in a memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). But if the specific ESK cue fails to 
activate knowledge at that level and must attempt to activate knowledge at the next level 
in the hierarchy (specific general event of going to that particular amusement park and 
taking a hot air balloon ride), the spread of activation may be too diffuse to generate a 
stable and focused enough pattern of autobiographical knowledge activation that can be 
deemed to constitute a memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).    
 A cue at the general event knowledge level, on the other hand, might be a picture 
of a non-specific amusement park, which will purportedly activate a collection of general 
events (various trips to amusement parks). Given the relative ambiguity of this cue (as 
compared to an ESK-level cue), the retrieval strategy employed will be generative 
retrieval, which as described above results in the iterative generation of retrieval products 
until the verification criteria are satisfied and the requisite threshold has been met in order 
to deem the product to be a memory. In sum, it is the nature of the cue provided that 
dictates the type of retrieval model generated. It is here that errors may occur via the 
intentional provision of misleading or entirely false retrieval cues, which in turn can 
result in false memory formation. Exactly how this occurs will be discussed in detail, 
following the review of the second key theory.                                                    
Source Monitoring Framework       
 Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay’s (1993) Source Monitoring Theory (SMF) 
conceptualizes memory as being a result of the cognitive processes that comprise our 
daily experiences (Lindsay, 2008). The very process of encoding an experience is filtered 
by our perceptions, attitudes, and interpretations of the situation. This view suggests that 
memories result from both perceptual and reflective processes, and that a combination of 
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flexible decision criteria and judgment processes at retrieval, coupled with the qualities of 
the mental representation, determine whether or not a memory will be accurately 
attributed to its origin or not. The meaning of the information, the physical surroundings, 
the emotions at the time, are all included in this memory by-product which can be used to 
provide cues about the source of the information.  Thinking about experiences reactivates 
them according to the same attitudes and expectations present at encoding. Thus, 
memories are a combination of actual experience as well as imagery, fantasy and 
inference (Bransford & Johnson, 1973).       
 According to SMF, remembering is inferential: It involves processes through 
which attributions are made about the origins of mental experiences. Mental components 
such as images, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts are attributed to a source (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). This source attribution is aided by a variety of cues, such 
as environmental cues or qualitative and quantitative cues from memory (Nash, Wade, & 
Lindsay, 2009). Cues are critical in that they have the capacity to revive many different 
features of a previously experienced event. Some may evoke a great deal of emotion 
whereas others may evoke more perceptual information. Which specific features a cue 
evokes depends on various factors. One such factor is the very nature of the cue itself, 
according to the principle of Transfer Appropriate Processing (or Encoding Specificity; 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973), which posits that the best retrieval cues are ones that match 
the conditions present at encoding. According to the source monitoring framework, 
various perceptual features of events (e.g. visual, auditory) are processed by different 
neural networks in the brain, which are then consolidated into an integrated memory 
representation. This process is called binding and is critical to the formation of 
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autobiographical memory (Newcombe, Lloyd & Ratliff, 2007). Binding, in turn, is key to 
the autonoetic (i.e. mental time travel, or the ability to mentally place ourselves in the 
past) quality of remembering described above. The stronger the binding of event 
fragments, the more likely it is that a large number of these fragments will be retrieved, 
such that the event will be re-experienced as vivid and coherent memory in response to a 
cue. Retrieving a personally-experienced event from memory is thought to elicit 
autonoetic consciousness (i.e. as if one has traveled back in time and can reflect upon 
their experience). A cue may trigger a particular feature of a past event, although the 
extent to which the entire event (i.e. a collection of composite features) is revived as a 
concrete memory depends on how well the constituent features have been bound together. 
Reflecting on a newly experienced event (i.e. engaging in elaborative encoding) 
strengthens binding and consolidates the memory for that event (Wixted, 2004). 
Moreover, SMF posits that the act of memory retrieval itself results in memory traces of 
that instance of retrieval - a kind of “meta-remembering.” Memory cues, however, 
rarely serve to retrieve a single event memory but rather a whole multitude of events that 
share features/episodic information triggered by (or related to) the cue that retrieved them 
(Lindsay, 2008). Furthermore, abstract knowledge, expectations, scripts and schemas are 
also evoked. These multiple episodes combine with general knowledge in order to 
pinpoint the specific memorial information that is sought. This enhances the efficiency of 
the system, because if the only way that a specific memory could be retrieved is by 
providing a specific cue, there would be no point of retrieval because the cue itself would 
constitute the sought after memory (Lindsay, 2008).     
 Once a memory is retrieved, the next task is to evaluate its source. The source 
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monitoring framework addresses the process by which individuals discriminate memories 
of externally generated information (i.e. perceived events) versus internally generated 
information (i.e. imagined events). Overall, monitoring of source is the result of 
evaluative processes by which the various characteristics of a mental experience are 
weighed and attributed to a specific origin, or source. The most important characteristics 
used in attributing source of memories include perceptual (sensory) information, 
contextual (place and time) information, semantic detail, affective information, and 
cognitive operations (the experience of organizing, elaborating, retrieving and identifying 
a given memory) that occur during encoding.     
 According to Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), mental experiences differ 
on several clearly defined dimensions. Namely, memories that originate from external 
experiences contain richer perceptual detail, more contextual detail, more semantic detail, 
and more affective detail. Conversely, memories that originate from imagination and 
from thinking about the perceived event contain more details about the cognitive 
processes that took place to generate them (i.e. thinking about thinking about the 
memory). The metacognitive evaluation processes that occur when judging the source of 
a memory take advantage of these inherent differences.    
 Source monitoring can occur in a heuristic manner (i.e. takes place quite rapidly 
and non-deliberatively) based on the characteristics of the mental experiences that are 
activated (Johnson et al., 1993). If the characteristics are consistent with those of true 
perceptual experiences, the mental experience will be judged to be a memory. Source 
monitoring can also involve slower, systematic (conscious) reasoning processes, which 
involve metacognitive beliefs about memory and can dictate retrieval of subsequent 
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material from memory with which to verify the source of the original mental 
representation. For example, a vivid memory of flying unaided is likely to be attributed as 
being a fantasy rather than a true recollection of a past experience, on account of 
knowledge that flying is impossible (Lindsay, 2008) Research has shown that individuals 
hold sets of beliefs about memory from a very early age (Cornoldi, Gobbo & Mazzoni, 
1990), which include beliefs that information encoded and stored in memory can be 
retrieved and that this retrieval takes effort but that it can be assisted with the provision of 
retrieval cues (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002).        
 Which judgment process is activated is largely a factor of retrieval context and 
cues provided, cost of error, and amount of distraction at the time of encoding (Johnson, 
1993). In informal contexts where memory accuracy is not paramount, judgment 
processes and evaluative criteria will be lower. Additionally, situations where one either 
already believes or wants to believe that the event occurred will yield more liberal 
judgment criteria. It is under these circumstances that the risk for source monitoring 
errors is high. If motivation to remember an event is high, the liberal judgment criteria 
can result in the conclusion that something was experienced, when in fact it may only 
have been imagined. As Conway (2005) put it when discussing his work with 
confabulating frontal lobe patients, “experiencing one’s fantasies as memories is clearly 
maladaptive, but it may nonetheless constitute an effective strategy for maintaining 
coherence.” That is to say, if there is a motivation to remember something as being a true 
memory rather than the product of imagination, source monitoring errors can be a useful 
tool employed by the working self to maintain coherence.      
 Both processes serve to verify each other to ensure accurate remembering and 
 32 
source attribution. They also require setting criteria for making judgments and then for 
comparing retrieval products with these criteria (Lindsay, 2008). Each process will have 
its own sets of criteria. For example, according to the more rapid heuristic processes, the 
criteria for judging a retrieval product to be a memory for a real event (versus an 
imagined one) may be that it has to contain more perceptual, contextual, semantic, or 
affective information, rather than information on cognitive operations. Additionally, each 
type of information may be assigned a weight that is used to determine source. For 
example, perceptual information may be assigned a higher weight for a recent event 
versus a more temporally distant event (Lindsay, 2008). The more systematic controlled 
processes, on the other hand, may involve judgment criteria that consider (and delimit) 
the degree of inconsistency that a retrieval product can have with what is known 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Put another way, episodic information that 
results from retrieval processes must be sufficiently consistent with information contained 
in an individuals’ autobiographical knowledge base in order for the source to be deemed 
to be an actually experienced event. Finally, in addition to the qualitative characteristics 
of the images generated by a retrieval cue, individuals may use the degree to which a 
mental experience is familiar to them - the greater degree of familiarity and ease with 
which a mental experience comes to mind (i.e. fluency of processing) is seen as 
consistent with a real memory (Nash, Wade & Brewer, 2009).            
Summary and Common Factors      
 Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose a self memory system in which the 
autobiographical knowledge base is reciprocally engaged with the working self such that, 
when activated, an autobiographical memory is constructed. A key concept in this system 
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is the initial cue - the stimulus that serves as the initial prompt to commence the retrieval 
process - as this is the piece of information on which all subsequent elaboration and 
verification is based. Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) propose a framework, 
which suggests that remembering is based on an inferential process wherein mental 
products are attributed to a particular source based on key qualitative characteristics. This 
typically occurs automatically, although more systematic process exists for instances 
where the heuristic processes fail to satisfactorily label a source.    
 These two models share some important similarities in terms of how they 
conceptualize memory retrieval. First, both models encompass two pathways of retrieval, 
one that is more direct and rapid whereas the other is more analytic, deliberate and 
systematic. With reference to the latter (slower, more deliberate) retrieval process, both 
the Self-Memory System (SMS) and the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) endorse 
the use of criteria according to which retrieval products are evaluated. In terms of SMF, 
the criteria are based on key memory characteristics (i.e. perceptual, semantic, contextual, 
affective, or cognitive-operational information) and serve to aide in evaluating the source 
of the mental product. This evaluation stage is impacted by motivation. If one is 
motivated to conclude that something is a memory, the evaluation criteria may be relaxed 
to maximize the possibility of such a conclusion. This is done to maximize coherence – a 
central goal of the working self. In terms of SMS, these criteria are generated based on 
information held in the autobiographical knowledge base, and serve to ensure that 
retrieval products are not dissonant with the goals of the working self. Additionally, there 
are general criteria as to what mental states are representative of a real memory (e.g. 
imagery rich in sensory perceptual properties), a concept similar to SMF as described 
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above.            
 Finally, both models underscore the importance of retrieval cues. According to 
SMS, cues to general events are actually the preferred level of entry into the knowledge 
base (Conway, 1996) when attempting to bring about recall of an event. In fact, when 
individuals are given a retrieval cue and prompted to retrieve a memory, the initial 
retrieval attempts are made at the level of general event knowledge because it is this level 
that allows the remembered to access a large amount of autobiographical data. Cues that 
are designed to access autobiographical knowledge at the level of ESK limit the 
individual to a single general event, thereby narrowing the breadth of the memory search. 
In terms of SMF, cues that are sufficiently general to invoke activation of memory 
information from a multitude of different episodes that share common features with the 
cue are ideal. When an event is encoded, many aspects and features of that event are 
bound together (and are further related to similar events). A general enough cue will 
allow not only features similar to the cue to be activated, but will also allow related 
features to be activated, thereby increasing the likelihood that the sought-after event will 
be retrieved.         
 Although they share some important similarities, a key distinction between SMS 
and SMF is that the latter does not propose a unique theory of basic memory processes, 
nor does it explicitly note the construct of the working self. Indeed, by design SMF has 
little to say about the nature of basic memory processes such as encoding, storage and 
retrieval mechanisms. The framework emphasizes metacognitive appraisal of the origins 
of information that is retrieved from memory, however it comes to be there. However, the 
framework is based on established assumptions about the mechanisms that contribute to 
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source judgments, and does acknowledge that the self is amongst many factors that shape 
these judgments, which are adopted into its explanations for how and under what 
circumstances these mechanisms fail. It is to these memory failures, from the perspectives 
of both theoretical frameworks, which we will turn to next.                               
Implications for False Memory Formation     
 Despite what appears to be an elaborate and autobiographically-grounded memory 
retrieval process, the system is not fool-proof and errors do happen. As referenced above, 
the downside of the flexibility of the threshold for making decisions about whether a 
mental representation constitutes an autobiographical memory is that it creates a margin 
of imprecision (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). Factors that lower the threshold (e.g. increased 
belief in the occurrence of the event) combined with those that enhance the quality of 
mental products generated in response to a cue (e.g. imagination, context-reinstatement, 
guided imagery) can contribute to false memory formation. For example, if an individual 
experiences fluency at the time of recall and is able to generate a rich and vivid mental 
representation in the absence of information that suggests the representation originates in 
a non-memorial source, the likelihood that this product will satisfy the threshold criterion 
for being labeled as a memory increases. It is in these instances that false memories can 
occur. However, given the flexibility of the threshold criterion, it is possible to develop a 
false memory even in the absence of a rich mental representation, providing that the 
threshold is lowered in other ways. Metacognitive beliefs play a major role in influencing 
this threshold. This is the reason that we are able to remember events that occurred a long 
time ago (and thus expect to be faded and less vivid than more recent memories), but it is 
also the conduit for false memory formation.      
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 Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) posited the following three-stage process 
according to which false memories can be formed: 1) Individuals must deem the event to 
be plausible; 2) individuals must be able to generate an image or a narrative of the event; 
and 3) individuals must misattribute these images/narratives as being memories (i.e. 
commit source monitoring errors). The Mazzoni and Kirsch model (2002) and the Nested 
Model (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & Relyea, 2004) both posit an additional stage of 
autobiographical belief generation preceding the imagery generation stage. That is to say, 
before individuals seek to generate event-specific imagery, they must first come to 
believe with sufficient conviction that the event constitutes part of their autobiographical 
past. According to this model, plausibility, belief, and memory are independent constructs 
and are nested such that memory implies belief, which implies plausibility but not the 
other way around. Although manipulations that increase belief may have no direct impact 
on affecting memory ratings, this increase in belief plays an important role in lowering 
the threshold for the evaluation of mental products that are constructed in response to 
cues. Simply providing individuals with prevalence information has been found to 
increase event plausibility ratings, while adding a rationale for why an event may be 
forgotten has been found to increase autobiographical belief ratings (Scoboria, Lynn, 
Hessen & Fisico, 2008). Although increasing plausibility has been found to influence 
belief ratings, and increasing both these constructs is necessary for influencing memory 
ratings, increasing these constructs alone is not sufficient to produce false memories 
(Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, and Relyea, 2004).      
 The fluency with which mental products are generated is a key aspect in the 
subjective experience of memory (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). One way of increasing 
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fluency is through imagination of an event, which has been demonstrated to increase 
individuals’ likelihood judgments that events occurred in the past (Garry, Manning, 
Loftus & Sherman, 1996; Garry & Polaschek, 2000), as well their memories for the event 
(Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). This phenomenon is termed imagination inflation and may 
occur irrespective of event plausibility (Sharman & Scoboria, 2009). Counterfactual 
thinking (i.e. imagining alternatives to reality) both about the past and the future, has also 
been found to inflate estimates about the likelihood that an event has occurred or will 
occur (Garry et al, 1996). Moreover, Goff and Roediger (1996) demonstrated that the 
more frequently an event is imagined, the more likely it is to be incorrectly judged to 
have actually taken place.  In terms of SMF, false memories can occur when mental 
experiences from one source are misattributed to a different (inaccurate) source (Lindsay 
& Johnson, 2000). In terms of the SMS, false memories can occur via the repeated, 
cyclical remembering process that occurs during generative retrieval. Specifically, the cue 
elaboration phase can fail such that a cue for the generation of a memory for a false event 
(e.g. doctored photograph) can recombine with candidate mental products generated in 
response to that cue. The resulting output becomes progressively distorted such that final 
retrieval product (a collage of candidate mental products intermingled with the 
misleading cue) can be deemed to “match” the verification criteria generated at the start 
of the search, thereby resulting in a false memory.      
 It appears, then, that false memory formation may be the result of a misleading 
retrieval cue in combination with elaborative processing that results in a mental product 
that is mistaken as a memory. The fluency with which this mental product is generated 
enhances the likelihood of such a mistake being made. A key factor in promoting fluency 
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of processing (and by extension, false memory formation) has been the presence of self-
relevant details in suggested events - most commonly, information about or images of the 
subject themselves. This has been demonstrated when using false narratives as the 
suggestive medium (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). However, when using photographs 
(either doctored or true) as a suggestive medium, the relative strength of the self as a 
fluency promoting retrieval cue is less clear. A review of the literature through the lens of 
the two theories outlined above may serve to refine the understanding of the memory 
formation mechanisms therein, and to subsequently clarify the steps in order to deepen 
that understanding.           
 To review, narratives, true photographs and doctored photographs have each 
emerged as powerful retrieval cues for inducing false memories, with some debate about 
their relative superiority. Although each type of suggestive cue is distinct, the presence of 
some kind of fluency promoting detail unites them. In the literature to date, a frequently 
used fluency promoting factor has been the presence of one or more self-relevant details. 
As above, the primary purpose of the present research is to investigate the evidently 
variable influence of fluency-promoting details in doctored and true photographs as one 
of the factors in either facilitating or limiting false memory formation.  
 Of the three suggestive media used to date (false narratives, false photograph, and 
true photographs), false narratives offer the fewest restrictions on ease with which mental 
products can be generated. Looking at false narratives and false photographs specifically, 
those in Garry and Wade’s (2005) narrative condition generated a considerably large 
amount of imagery by the first encounter with the stimulus, which came to be judged by a 
sizeable proportion as memory by the participants in the third interview. This was 
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reflected in the fact that the percentage of memories approximately quadrupled from the 
first to third interview in the narrative condition, whereas it only doubled for those in the 
photograph condition. A possible explanation is that although the photograph provides 
very rich perceptual details, it also constrains key aspects of processing (i.e. via the 
implication that the event occurred exactly as depicted and thus should be remember that 
way). The result is an attenuation of the total amount and/or quality of images formed, 
thereby lowering the overall percentage of  ‘memory’ formed. Put another way, when 
individuals first encountered the photograph, they struggled to generate a mental 
representation. Upon continued exposure, their ability to form a mental representation 
increased given the vivid visual characteristic of the stimulus. However, the overall image 
generation was impeded in the face of the rigid cue. Those in the narrative condition 
formed a larger albeit less focused mental representation, and by re-encountering the 
narrative during the interviews appeared to judge this imagery threshold as sufficient to 
be labeled a memory.       
 Conceptualizing these findings from the SMS perspective, the doctored 
photograph cue is at the level of event-specific knowledge (ESK). It represents a highly 
vivid and specific cue, thereby restricting spreading activation to only one single life 
event (or one episode) from one single life period. Because the false event did not occur, 
the cue will fail to activate knowledge at the ESK level and will attempt to activate at the 
general event knowledge level. The resulting pattern of autobiographical knowledge 
activation will be too diffuse to be readily considered a memory (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000), hence the lesser degree of false memory formation in Garry and Wade’s 
(2005) photograph condition. Moreover, the doctored photograph is a cue that may favour 
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the direct retrieval mechanism because it implies that the event occurred exactly as 
depicted (and thus must be remembered so). As such, the threshold criterion against 
which constructed mental products are compared is raised. When fluent generation of 
imagery consistent with the event does not occur, this may be deemed diagnostic of the 
event not having happened (Mazzoni & Kirsch model, 2002).   
 The narrative is also a highly specific cue. However, due to its relatively less 
constraining nature, it activates autobiographical knowledge at the general event level, 
and thus enhances spreading activation such that a larger amount of events are activated. 
Also, given its relative ambiguity, a generative retrieval process is employed which, as 
described above, consists of an iterative three stage process including retrieval cue 
elaboration and establishment of verification criteria, matching the elaborated cue to 
activated memories, which are then compared to the verification criteria. As this cycle 
continues across iterations, the narrative lends itself better to the modification and 
distortion, which likely occurs based on the discrepancy-reducing goal of the working 
self. Although discrepancies – and resulting emotional disruption - between aspects of the 
self occur on a continuum, instances in which one is presented with a cue ostensibly 
representative of an autobiographical event that cannot be readily remembered is a 
circumstance that contributes to sufficient emotional disruption, and corresponding 
motivation to resolve same. All told, greater activation may take place at the general 
event level, the preferred level of entry into the autobiographical knowledge base 
(Conway, 1996), and for which narrative cues appear to be best suited.    
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In terms of SMF, false memories can occur when mental experiences from one 
source are erroneously attributed to a different source (Lindsay & Johnson, 2000). A large 
percentage of participants in Garry and Wade’s (2005) narrative condition generated 
images at the very first interview. Repeated contact with the narrative created favorable 
conditions for source monitoring errors to occur. That is to say, the more rapid, heuristic 
retrieval process that are initially employed according to SMF likely resulted in an 
incorrect attribution to past occurrence (i.e. that the imagery is due to the event having 
actually occurred in the past rather than because it had been imagined at the previous 
interview). This source identification, albeit incorrect, may have been bolstered by the 
degree to which the mental experience elicited feelings of familiarity, a factor that is 
consistent with a real memory (Nash, Wade & Brewer, 2009).    
 A significantly smaller percentage of individuals in the photograph condition 
generated imagery at the first interview, and thus reality monitoring errors at interview 
two were less likely. Heuristic retrieval would have failed to identify the source of the 
imagery generated at the second interview and thus the more systematic, deliberate 
retrieval process would have been employed as a “checkpoint,” thereby resulting is lower 
likelihood of endorsement of the false event. Also, an overall lack of familiarity with the 
mental products generated may have contributed to a greater likelihood of event rejection. 
Thus, it appears as though conditions wherein imagery generation is enhanced results in a 
higher amount of false memory formation, as the source of that imagery is misattributed 
to the past. But is it just about being able to generate images, or do the images need to 
have certain qualitative characteristics?     
 Considering these findings in the context of Lindsay et al.’s (2004) study, it 
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appears as though the narrative with photograph condition capitalizes on both the rich 
perceptual details that photographs provide as well as the descriptive but non-constraining 
nature of the narrative. Based on the percentage of images and memories in the narrative 
alone versus the narrative plus photograph conditions, it appears that participants in both 
conditions are using the narrative to generate an image of the target event in their mind. 
However, it is possible that the mental images of those in the “with photo” condition are 
enhanced on account of the vivid perceptual - but non-specific - details of the photograph. 
The rich mental representation that is generated meets the criteria for being judged a 
“memory.” Thus, it appears that rather than image generation itself, being able to 
generate highly perceptually vivid imagery enhances the likelihood of source attribution 
errors, thereby creating optimal conditions for false memory formation.    
 According to both the self-memory-system (SMS) and the source-monitoring 
framework (SMF), the explanation for what is occurring in the narrative alone condition 
is identical to that of the narrative condition in Garry and Wade’s (2005) study outlined 
above. Conceptualizing the narrative with photograph condition from the SMS 
perspective, the photograph adds rich visual cues which are non-specific (i.e. the 
photograph does not depict the actual event in question) which enhances activation at the 
general event level of the autobiographical knowledge base. Given that both the narrative 
and the true non-specific photograph are non-constraining stimuli, the cycles of 
generative retrieval benefit from the flexibility that is present with narrative alone. They 
also capitalize on the rich visual cues in the photograph, which are filled in with activated 
event-related imagery accessed through contact with episodic memory system (i.e. past 
instances of having seen – but not experienced - a hot air balloon, either in pictures, 
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movies, commercials). The resulting vivid mental imagery is more likely to be deemed to 
be a memory, and thus the false event is more likely to be endorsed as true.  
 From the SMF perspective, Lindsay et al.’s (2004) narrative with photograph 
condition provided rich perceptual details that related to the participants’ first grade 
experiences. Exposure to the narrative led to the generation of imagery associated with 
the false event. Seeing their elementary school classmates in the photograph provided 
salient cues, resulting in activation of memories of past interactions and experiences. The 
activated memories in the context of the false narrative likely resulted in the blending of 
these two sources of information to produce a compelling image of the false event 
(Lindsay et al. 2004). This is consistent with Johnson et al. (1988) who posit that 
memories similar in perceptual characteristics or semantic content are more likely to be 
confused. So, if one remembers interactions with one’s classmates from elementary 
school, these memories can be confused with the imagery generated in response to the 
narrative (and enhanced by the vivid perceptual details in the photograph) such that the 
false event is endorsed as true. Moreover, it has been empirically demonstrated that 
rehearsing imagined events can serve to preserve and embellish them (Suengas & 
Johnson, 1988). Here, the assistive photograph allows for the heuristic (automatic) 
processes of source monitoring to prevail once the slower more systematic ones have 
done the initial work of generating event-specific memory-like images. The heuristic 
processes are further facilitated by the delay between interviews, such that by the second 
interview, the initial imagery becomes misattributed to an external source (i.e. having 
previously experienced the event) instead of an internal one (i.e. imagining this event).                                                                                                                                                              
Summary of Current Knowledge and How to Proceed     
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 The research to date suggests that narratives on their own potentially facilitate a 
wide range of imagery, but the images are less perceptually vivid compared to viewing a 
photograph. Doctored, event-specific photographs potentially facilitate a more narrow 
range of imagery, but the images are richer due to the externally available vivid visual 
properties of photographs. A narrative paired with a true, non-event-specific photograph 
potentially maximizes the quantity and quality of the images, which are then more likely 
to be experienced as memories. Again, a caveat here is that in order for a non-specific 
true photograph to be a retrieval cue for a particular event, it must be paired with a 
narrative that provides a sufficient description of the event that is to be retrieved. The 
advantage of a doctored photograph is that no such narrative is necessary - the 
photograph on its own with a brief label identifying the event and the people present is 
sufficient to cue what should be remembered.       
 In sum, the fact that false memories can be induced has been established in the 
literature. Frequency of false memory formation has varied depending on the particular 
suggestive medium employed and the relative balance of details therein. Moreover, event-
specific photographs have been compared with narratives, the latter yielding a higher 
false memory formation rate than the former (Garry & Wade, 2005). However, there has 
been no comparison made between photograph types in the literature to date .This is, 
what still remains to be determined is which type of photograph (non-event-specific or 
event-specific) constitutes a superior retrieval cue and what relative roles are played by 
the implied frame of reference and/or the detail content of each photograph type. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this research program was to “dismantle” the photographs 
used in the literature to date and examine how the component parts contribute to the 
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underlying mechanism by which they induced false memory formation. The hot-air 
balloon ride target event was used for continuity with existing research and to allow for 
comparison with same. This research is unique in that it is the first time that the 
underlying components within a photograph are separated to examine their respective 
influences on false memory formation. Moreover, it is the first time that an event-absent 
photograph and an event-specific photograph are directly compared to one another.  
Study 1           
 The first step is to note the fundamental way in which doctored photographs and 
true photographs are different - not in terms of visual content but in terms of the implied 
message regarding the breadth of the frame of reference, or context - of the photographic 
cue (i.e. general event category cue versus single specific event cue). To date, doctored 
photographs have depicted the exact event that is suggested. In the true photograph study 
to date, however, the photograph was a non-specific image from the same life period as 
the suggested event, but which was not taken on the day that the event occurred. As such, 
not only is the content of the photograph different but also what the photograph signifies 
is different, and hence the photograph is likely used quite differently when searching for a 
memory. Both the Self-Memory System (SMS) and the Source Monitoring Framework 
(SMF) make similar predictions about relative rates of false memory formation in each 
condition.           
 The doctored photographs used in research to date imply a narrow frame of 
reference (‘during the event’). As such, it activates the autobiographical knowledge base 
at the level of ESK and limits spreading activation to one single event from one single life 
period. The generative retrieval memory search model will be constrained by very 
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specific verification criteria based on the photograph content. Similarly such a rigid 
retrieval cue likely limits freedom of imagination. Thus, the opportunity for source 
monitoring errors is reduced, which reduces the degree of false memory formation that 
can occur.            
 To determine if the different content of the two photograph types alone influences 
false memory formation, or if the frame of reference implied by the content plays a part 
as well, these two factors must be separated. The frame of reference implied by doctored 
photographs cannot be manipulated, as it is tied to the content (i.e. if the photograph 
shows the event in question, one cannot suggest that it is merely a “related” photograph). 
However, it is possible to do so with a true photograph, which is what is examined in the 
first study. Namely, the instructions with which the photograph is presented to the 
participants will be manipulated such that one group will be told that the photograph is 
“from that time period” whereas the other group will be told “this is a photograph taken 
during the event.” Examining how exposure to the same photograph in the presence of 
different information about the photo will allow for the separation of these two potentially 
confounding influences (i.e. content and frame of reference) on retrieval cue processing. 
Using the methodology employed by Lindsay et al (2004) and the hot air balloon ride 
target event employed by Garry and Wade (2005) three conditions were created: 1) 
Narrative alone; 2) Narrative + True Photograph (from that time period); and 3) Narrative 
+ True Photograph (”taken during the event”). Both photograph conditions included the 
presentation of a photograph of the participant posing with either parent against a 
nondescript background (i.e. grass, trees, and the like). The no photograph (narrative 
alone) condition served as a control to allow for comparisons with Lindsay et al.’s (2004) 
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findings.           
 This research is important in that it strives to empirically demonstrate that the way 
in which a visual stimulus is utilized in the effort to retrieve autobiographical memories 
can be influenced by the frame of reference implied by the accompanying instructions.   
Hypotheses.         
 Hypothesis 1. According to both SMS and SMF, it was predicted that the “from 
that time period” photograph would yield higher false memory formation rates, subjective 
belief and memory ratings, and higher memory quality ratings than would the “no 
photograph” condition (see Figure 2). This was based on Lindsay et al.’s (2004) findings 
and is consistent with both SMS and SMF. In the case of the former, the photograph adds 
rich visual cues which enhance the activation at the general event level of the 
autobiographical knowledge base. The resulting vivid mental imagery is more likely to be 
deemed to be a memory than that formed secondary to a narrative alone, and thus the 
false event is more likely to be endorsed as true. In the case of SMF, the assistive 
photograph provides the vivid perceptual details that enhance the images created by the 
narrative. This enhanced imagery promotes the more rapid, heuristic processes of 
retrieval, which is more likely to bring about source monitoring errors, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of false memory endorsement.     
 Hypothesis 2. It was also predicted that the “no photograph” condition would 
yield higher false memory formation rates, subjective belief and memory ratings, and 
higher memory quality ratings than would the “photograph taken during event” condition. 
This is consistent with Garry and Wade’s (2005) findings, as well as with both SMS and 
SMF. In the case of the former, the photograph activates the autobiographical knowledge 
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base at the ESK level of the autobiographical knowledge base. This highly specific entry 
point constrains spreading activation and the degree of imagery generated, which is less 
likely to be deemed to be a memory than is the narrative alone. In the case of SMF, the 
assistive photograph provides the vivid perceptual details, but the narrow temporal frame 
of reference limits the degree of imagery generated. Accordingly, greater and more 
deliberate cognitive operations are necessary to generate retrieval products. The resulting 
memorial features of the retrieval products are less likely to be misinterpreted as arising 
from perception. As such, source monitoring errors are less likely to occur, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood of false memory endorsement. The narrative alone, however, 
allows for greater freedom in generating event-specific imagery which enhances source-
monitoring errors, and in turn, false memory formation.    
 Hypothesis 3. It was also predicted that the wider “from that time period” 
temporal frame of reference would yield higher false memory formation rates, subjective 
belief and memory ratings, and higher memory quality ratings than would the narrower 
“photograph taken during the event” temporal frame of reference (see Figure 2). 
According to SMS the wider frame of reference allows for activation at the general event 
level of the autobiographical knowledge base such that many different (but related) 
episodes consistent with the cue will be triggered (i.e. many different amusement parks, 
all the fun times had with dad, all the fun times had with mom, going on fun rides). 
Conversely, the narrower temporal frame of reference restricts activation to the ESK level 
such that cues are interpreted literally (i.e. when was I with dad specifically, wearing that 
hat, at this particular amusement park) with the expectation that rapid, autoneotic 
processing should be aroused. If this does not occur, spreading activation will be too 
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diffuse to bring about a stable pattern of activation across all three levels of the 
autobiographical knowledge base hierarchy, and the event is thus less likely to be 
endorsed as true. Similarly, SMF predicts that the wider frame of reference will foster the 
generation of a greater amount of event-related mental imagery, which with repeated 
imagination can result in a higher likelihood of source monitoring errors. In the narrower 
temporal frame of reference, on the other hand, the images generated will be limited to 
ones that are highly similar to the ones depicted in the photograph, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of source monitoring errors.                                           
Study 2           
 I subsequently examined if there was a “middle ground” between non-specific 
true photographs and event-specific doctored photographs that capitalizes on the benefits 
of both types while omitting the detriments of each. This was done by creating a doctored 
photograph that was non-event specific. Using the hot air balloon ride target event, this 
photograph combined a generic true photograph of an individual posing with their parent 
against a nondescript background, but included the inserted image of a hot air-balloon in 
the background. The advantage of such a photograph was that it combines the non-
constrained nature of a non-event specific true photograph (i.e. the target event of actually 
taking a hot air balloon ride is not depicted) while at the same time presenting a visual 
cue related to the target event. However, another notable difference between true 
photographs and doctored photographs that needed to be addressed before a 
methodologically sound comparison could be made is the fact that true photographs are 
authentic whereas doctored photographs are not. The digital alteration of the photograph 
itself may result in the stimulus being interpreted differently than its non-altered  
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Figure 2. Predicted rate of false memory formation as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
 
Note: Percentages are illustrative of the predicted pattern of results; the specific rates and 
magnitude of differences are not predicted. 
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counterpart. This represented a confound that needed to be remedied, while still 
preserving the unique message conveyed by each stimulus in order for a true comparison 
to be made. A true photograph, as employed in false memory research to date, has 
depicted fluency-promoting details while remaining vague and non-event specific (i.e. 
participant visible but not engaging in the target event). The background in this case is 
not critical to the message conveyed by the stimulus. Therefore, this was the locus where 
the stimulus was  doctored to address the noted confound, while keeping the message of 
the stimulus intact – as will be illustrated in more detail below. The critical point here is 
that underlying messages conveyed by the various photographs are predictive of false 
memory formation rather than simply the fact that they are altered.   
 Using the methodology employed by Lindsay et al (2004) along with the hot air 
balloon ride target event employed by Garry and Wade (2005), three conditions were 
created: 1) Doctored, event-absent photograph (depicting the participant and parent 
posing against a nondescript background), which provided a very wide frame of reference 
for generating idiosyncratic imagery but with the absence of visual cues relating to the 
target event; 2) Doctored non-event-specific photograph (depicting the participant and 
parent, doctored to be posing again a nondescript background with a hot air balloon 
floating in the sky), which provided a very wide frame of reference for generating 
imagery while also providing visual cues relating to the target event; and 3) Doctored 
event-specific photograph (depicting the participant and parent, doctored to be posing 
inside the basket of a hot air balloon) which provide a narrow frame of reference for 
imagery generation given that the visual cues provided are organized in a specific way 
that restricts freedom to generate other images related to the event. All conditions 
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included a brief description denoting the event, the age of the participant at the time, and 
a sentence describing what took place. Also, all three photographs were doctored so as to 
appear against the exact same background, thereby addressing the methodological 
confound identified above.         
 This study represents the first time that a traditional (i.e. event-specific) doctored 
photograph was compared with an event-absent photograph. To date, the only study 
employing a an event-absent photograph also included a detailed narrative, and yielded a 
combined false memory and imagery formation rate of 72.8% (Lindsay et al, 2004) as 
compared to an average 50% combined false memory and imagery formation rate for 
doctored photographs (Wade et al, 2002; Garry & Wade, 2005). Although Lindsay et al. 
(2004) employed a completely true, unaltered photograph, the event-absent doctored 
photograph in the present study extracts the essential elements within that cue that impact 
false memory formation (absence of target event, presence of subject and other self-
relevant details). However, it would be premature to conclude based on these findings 
that event-absent photographs will yield higher false memory formation rates than will 
doctored photographs. One important consideration is that a hot air balloon ride is rated 
low on personal plausibility in Ontario (Scoboria, Hessen-Kayfitz, Fisico, unpublished 
data). Although no data exist regarding personal plausibility ratings of Lindsay et al.’s 
(2004) childhood prank target example, it is arguable that this event is more likely to 
occur at a higher frequency than the hot air balloon ride event.    
 Nevertheless, results suggesting that event-absent doctored photographs (i.e. most 
similar conceptually to otherwise true photographs) promote higher false memory 
formation than do more explicitly doctored photographs would have interesting 
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implications in both therapeutic and legal settings - especially when the former are paired 
with a narrative that is inaccurate (intentionally so or not). Such findings would imply 
that the likelihood of circumstances resulting in false memories are higher in the real 
world than previously thought. Individuals in therapeutic settings seek answers for their 
distressing symptoms, and are susceptible to accepting suggestions that offer explanations 
for same. Once they form a belief, confirmatory bias suggests that new information 
presented may be modified, dismissed, or embellished to the extent that it is consistent 
with the new theory they have come to believe (Nickerson, 1998). Certain clinical 
populations are more susceptible to suggestion (e.g. dissociative disorders are 
characterized by disruption in memory, identity, and perception). Indeed, higher levels of 
dissociation have been found to be associated with memory errors and false memory 
formation in a variety of studies (e.g. Dorahy, 2001; Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2002; 
Wright & Osborn, 2005). Children represent another population that is extremely 
vulnerable to false memory formation. It has been demonstrated that children can come to 
“remember” highly implausible events (Strange, Sutherland & Garry, 2006), or even truly 
bizarre, ritualistic sexual abuse (e.g. People v. Akiki, 1993; State v. Michaels, 1994). 
 In legal settings, individuals may be shown crime scene photographs, or may be 
questioned in a manner designed to enhance their remembering. Although individuals are 
highly unlikely to be presented with a doctored photograph (although in some 
jurisdictions, presenting fabricated evidence to elicit a confession is permitted; Nash, 
Wade, and Brewer, 2009), initial research findings suggest that such extreme measures 
may not be necessary in order to successfully create false memories (Lindsay et al, 2004). 
Therefore, the ease with which false memories can be formed has far reaching and serious 
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implications - especially if such memory errors can come to occur via seemingly 
innocuous visual stimuli paired with subtle suggestion.        
Hypotheses.         
 Hypothesis 1. It was predicted that doctored, event-absent photographs would 
yield a higher false memory formation rate, subjective belief and memory ratings, and 
higher memory quality ratings than would doctored, event specific photographs (see 
Figure 3). According to SMS, an event-specific photograph constitutes a retrieval cue at 
the level of ESK. Because the false event did not actually occur, the rigid specificity of 
the cue would fail to sufficiently activate knowledge at the ESK level and spreading 
activation would be too diffuse to generate a sufficiently stable and focused pattern of 
autobiographical knowledge activation to be readily considered a memory (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Moreover, the doctored, event-specific photograph cue may 
favour the direct retrieval mechanism. Failure of rapid remembering may signal that the 
event did not happen. A doctored, event-absent photograph, on the other hand, constitutes 
a retrieval cue at the lifetime period level of the autobiographical knowledge base. 
Although not the preferred general event level, it would allow for a greater opportunity 
for a stable pattern of activation across all three levels of the autobiographical knowledge 
base. As such, a greater amount of mental imagery of related event features would be 
activated. Similarly, SMF posits that the highly specific nature of the even-specific 
photograph retrieval cue would serve to constrain imagination. As such, less opportunities 
for source monitoring errors would arise by virtue of rapid heuristic retrieval processes. 
The more systematic, deliberate retrieval process would be employed as a “checkpoint,” 
which, combined with an overall lack of familiarity with the mental products generated, 
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would contribute to a greater likelihood of event rejection. Conversely, doctored, event-
absent photographs would foster comparatively greater imagination, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of rapid, heuristic processes. This, in turn, would result in source 
monitoring errors that remain unchecked, given that the imagery would be generated in 
concert with the visual stimulus of the photograph, one of the key characteristic of true 
memories.          
 Hypothesis 2. It was predicted that doctored, non-event specific photograph 
would yield the highest false memory formation rate, subjective belief and memory 
ratings, and higher memory quality ratings as compared to both doctored, event-absent 
photographs and doctored, event-specific photographs (see Figure 3). I proposed that 
doctored, non-event specific photographs constitute the ideal retrieval cue in that it 
accesses the autobiographical knowledge base at the general event level. Similarly, given 
that both self-relevant and target-event-related cues are presented in a non-specific 
format, the raw materials for imagery generation, binding of elaborated retrieval cues 
with mental products, and subsequent source monitoring errors are in place. In fact, the 
act of having to piece together the “raw material” cues in the photograph (i.e. oneself, 
one’s parent, the hot air balloon) into a mental representation of a hot air balloon ride 
with one’s parent is similar to Berstein, Whittlesea, and Loftus’ (2002) study. The authors 
asked their participants to rate how confident they were that they experienced various 
events in childhood. Some of these events were presented as anagrams (i.e. “I broke a 
dwinow,” instead of “I broke a window”), and results suggested that participants 
endorsed greater confidence in having experienced these events than the ones not in 
anagram form. The surprising fluency experienced by the individuals when they solved 
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the anagram was misattributed to having experienced the event.     
 This can be compared to the present study, wherein participants needed to work to 
generate a mental representation of the target event, but are provided with highly vivid 
retrieval cues while not being constrained at all in the types of images they form. That is 
to say, the memory retrieval model generated is ideal. Doctored, event-absent 
photographs, conversely, result in too wide a memory retrieval model and doctored, 
event-specific photographs result in too narrow a memory retrieval model. In sum, it 
appears as though it could be a matter of “too broad, too tight, or just right!” 
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Figure 3. Predicted rate of false memory formation as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
Note: Percentages are illustrative of the predicted pattern of results; the specific rates and 
magnitude of differences are not predicted. 
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CHAPTER II 
Study 1 Method 
Participants and Setting.  
Of the 350 participants invited to participate, 70 provided their parents’ contact 
information. Forty-one responses from parents were received, two of which needed to be 
disqualified due to the individual having actually taken a hot air balloon ride as a child. 
Additionally, three participants repeatedly never attended the first session. As such, the 
sample included 36 University of Windsor students (29 female) between the ages of 17 
and 30 (M = 19.5, SD = 1.8). Participants received either cash ($20 for attending all three 
sessions) or academic credit as compensation, and were also entered in a raffle for 2 
prizes of an audio player.  
Design and Materials 
 Soliciting information from parents. Participants’ parents were contacted by 
mail for the purpose of obtaining photographs of the participant before they were of age 
six. Parents were given a list of themes to assist in selecting photographs (e.g. birthday 
parties, barbecues, family outings, etc). Parents were requested to select pictures that 
contain groups of people in social situations, and to the degree possible, photographs that 
the participant has not seen before. For each photograph, parents were asked to provide a 
brief narrative of what was occurring in the picture. Furthermore, parents were asked 
whether to their knowledge their child has ever taken a hot air balloon in their life. 
Parents were guaranteed that the photographs they provide would be returned to them in 
the original condition provided. Upon receipt, the materials were reviewed. If appropriate 
for the study, the participant was contacted and scheduled for the first interview; they 
were randomized to groups at this point.  
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Booklets. If in the appropriate condition (see below), four photographs were 
selected from those provided and scanned at high resolution. A booklet was created, 
which contained four narratives (three true and one that was false) that described an 
event. For participants assigned to one of the two “with photo” conditions, a booklet of 
four 4 X 6 black and white photographs was created. The photograph accompanying the 
false narrative included the participant and their parent in the foreground, set against a 
nondescript background of grass and trees. There was one photograph on each page 
printed at high resolution (1200 dpi). Participants were told that photographs were black 
and white because the originals submitted needed to be scanned, digitalized, and returned 
to their parents in good condition and that the printer used only enables black and white 
printing. Although color printing adds richer visual detail, which may impact the 
vividness of imagery (and by extension promote greater false memory formation), black 
and white printing allows for more seamless digital manipulation. This has been the 
printing method of choice in the previous studies of this kind, thereby allowing for 
matched comparison between studies. Finally, by rendering all photographs black and 
white, the photograph representing the false event is less likely to stand out as having 
been altered. An obvious trade-off is that by making all photographs look different from 
the originals may have slightly reduced their overall memory-promoting power - which 
may partially explain the slightly lower percentage of recall for true events compared to 
existing research. 
Creation of Conditions. Prior to the first session, participants were randomly 
assigned to the three experimental conditions: 1) Narrative alone; 2) Narrative + True 
Photograph (from that time period); and 3) Narrative + True Photograph (”taken during 
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the event”). The photograph contained the participant and their parent posing against a 
neutral non-descript backdrop. The configuration of detail in photographs is depicted in 
Figure 4. The narrative employed, adapted from Garry and Wade (2005), was:  
When	  you	  were	  between	  [4–6]	  years	  old,	  you	  and	  your	  [mom/dad]	  went	  up	  in	  a	  hot	  air	  
balloon	  in	  [participant’s	  home	  town].	  You	  didn’t	  go	  far	  off	  the	  ground	  because	  the	  
ropes	  anchoring	  the	  balloon	  were	  still	  attached.	  It	  was	  around	  May/June.	  	  
Measures. 
          ABMQ. Participants completed the Autobiographical Belief and Memory 
Questionnaire (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Appendix I). This 
questionnaire assesses general and personal plausibility (where 1 = not at all plausible, 
and 8 = extremely plausible); autobiographical belief (where 1 = definitely did not happen 
and 8 = definitely did happen); and autobiographical memory (where 1 = no memory for 
the event at all and 8 = clear and complete memory for the event). This measure was 
employed as in Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria (2011). Participants were asked to rate each 
of these constructs for five different events. The first, fourth and fifth events were the 
same for all of the participants (choking on an object, bone density screening, seeing a 
UFO). One of the participants’ true events was placed second and the false event was 
placed third. This was done so that the false event did not stand out. Research on the 
ABMQ has found that individuals are able to distinguish these constructs within events, 
and that events vary in the level of each construct (Scoboria et al, 2004). Furthermore, 
ratings tend to remain stable when not manipulated across 2 week periods of time and 
change as predicted when manipulated (Scoboria et al., 2006).  
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 Judges’ ratings. Based upon the transcripts from the first and third interviews, 
two independent judges who were blind to the experimental condition classified 
participants as having either (1) no images; (2) images only; or (3) memories for each of 
the four events. This procedure is consistent with Lindsay et al.’s (2004) criteria. 
Participants who reported actual memories were coded into the memory category, 
whereas those who described images associated with the event, but not definitive 
memories, were classified in the images category. Images constituted only reporting what 
the participant saw in the photograph and describing where the event may have taken 
place. Memories constituted reporting what the participant saw, but also adding details 
that were not contained in the photographs, descriptions of what they may have been 
thinking and feeling, and what it may have been like to have experienced the event. The 
judges were two research assistants employed in the lab. They were trained for coding 
using sample event transcripts until an inter-rater agreement of 90% was obtained. The 
judges attained an inter-rater agreement of 88% on the actual transcripts; disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. 
Memory Characteristics Questions. Participants also rated the quality of 
memories for all events using questions Garry and Wade (2005; Appendix J) adapted 
from Berntsen, Willert, and Rubin (2003). On a 7-point scale (1 = low, 7 = high), 
participants rated whether they could: (1) relive the event in their mind; (2) see the event 
in their mind; (3) hear the event in their mind; (4) feel emotions associated with the event; 
(5) remember the event rather than just know that it happened; (6) remember the event as 
a coherent story; (7) believe the event occurred in the way remembered; and (8) whether 
they had talked/thought about the event in the past. 
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Procedure          
 All procedures were reviewed by the University of Windsor Research Ethics 
Board. Participants were asked to provide parental contact information, and were told that 
their parents would be contacted for the purpose of obtaining non-sensitive information 
about their childhoods. Once parents provided the information, four photographs were 
selected to make up the individual participant booklets.   
 Participants were interviewed three times over the course of one week, according 
to Garry and Wade’s (2005) procedure (see Table 1). This procedure is also identical to 
that used by Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria (2011). During the first interview, participants 
were told that the purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of memory 
recovery techniques on memory for childhood events. They were told that their parents 
provided the descriptions of events. The narratives were ordered so that the first, second, 
and fourth were true events and the third was the false event. The narrative was read 
aloud to the participant by the research assistant. If in one of the “with photograph” 
conditions, the accompanying photograph was presented with the instructions, “here is a 
photograph taken during the event to help you remember,” or, “here is a photograph taken 
during that time period to help you remember.” After each narrative was read, and with 
the narrative (plus photograph if appropriate) remaining in front of them, the participant 
was asked to describe everything they could remember about the event without leaving 
anything out. In situations where the participant did not remember the event, he or she 
was told that many people have difficulty remembering events that happened long ago as 
they had not thought about them, and was then engaged in a guided imagery exercise 
wherein he or she was instructed to concentrate for a few minutes and to try to bring the  
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Figure 4. Illustration of the three experimental conditions in Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
No Photograph Here is a photograph from that 
time period 
Here is a photograph taken during 
the event 
 
                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
Note: Circle added to camouflage identity of participant 
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event into focus. They were told to close their eyes and try to imagine that they were back 
in the situation depicted in the photograph. They were encouraged to focus on the details 
of the event, such as what they may have felt that day, what it may have been like to 
experience the event, who was with them, and the season. Then they were asked what, if 
anything, they could remember. If they could not remember any further details, the next 
photograph was introduced and the above procedure was repeated. In situations where the 
participant freely recalled a complete memory for the event (i.e. stated that they 
remembered and/or provided an elaborate verbal account which included details not 
provided in the cue), they were simply asked if there were any additional details they 
could recall before the next photograph was introduced. Participants’ verbal event 
descriptions were audio recorded during the first and last interviews for the purposes of 
transcription and scoring of inter-rater agreement.  
 Once participants were unable to remember any more details about each of the 
photographs, they were asked to fill out the memory questionnaire to describe the quality 
of the memories they had for each event. They were given the personalized booklet 
containing their photographs, and were asked to review it once daily to try to remember 
the events contained in the photographs. Participants were also instructed not to discuss 
the events in their booklet with anyone during the course of the study.   
The subsequent interviews followed the same format as the first, in that the 
participant was asked to describe everything they could remember about the event 
without leaving anything out, and the decision to employ guided imagery was employed 
based on the same criteria, After imagining each event, participants were asked to 
describe any details remembered. If no new information was remembered, the research 
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assistant proceeded to the next event. The memory questionnaire was not administered 
during Interview 2. After Interview 3, once participants completed the memory 
questionnaire, they were asked to complete the ABMQ. They were then asked how 
frequently they thought about events during the week, and whether they discussed any of 
the events with others. Participants were then told that one of the events was false, and 
the research assistant asked them to select which of the events they thought it was. 
Finally, the research assistant disclosed the false event, and participants were debriefed. 
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Table 1.  
Timeline and content of the three interviews  
 
Interview #1 Interview #2 Interview #3 
 
• Told photos provided 
by parents. 
• Asked to provide 
maximum details (i.e. 
free recall). 
• Guided imagery (if 
event not 
remembered). 
• MCQ Administered 
 
 
• Asked to provide 
maximum details 
(i.e. free recall) 
• Guided imagery (if 
event not 
remembered). 
 
 
• Asked to provide 
maximum details 
(i.e. free recall) 
• Guided imagery (if 
event not 
remembered). 
• MCQ Administered 
• ABMQ 
Administered 
• Guess False 
Photograph 
• Debriefing 
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CHAPTER III 
Study 1 Results 
Judges’ ratings 
 To review from above, the transcripts from the first and third interviews were 
rated as either constituting (1) no images; (2) images only (only reporting what the 
participant saw in the photograph and describing where the event may have taken place); 
or (3) memories (reporting what the participant saw, but also adding details that were not 
contained in the photographs as well as descriptions of what they may have been thinking 
and feeling what it may have been like to have experienced the event) for each of the four 
events. Examples of each classification are illustrated in Table 2. 
Overall true image and memory formation. In order to provide a comparison 
for the yield of false memories formed, participants’ memories for their true events were 
analyzed. Analysis of judges’ ratings of interview transcripts for all three conditions 
revealed that at Interview 3, 88.89% of participants were judged to have memories for the 
three true events, compared to 73.58% at Interview 1. Furthermore, 98.15% of 
participants were judged to have generated images or memories at Interview 3, as 
compared to 89.81% at Interview 1.  
Overall false images and memories formed. Analysis of judges’ ratings of 
interview transcripts for all three conditions revealed that at Interview 3, 20% of 
participants were judged to have memories for the false event, compared to 20.59% at 
Interview 1. Furthermore, 48.57% of participants were judged to have generated images 
or memories at Interview 3, as compared to 55.88% at Interview 1. These differences 
were not statistically significant (p > 0.1).      
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 False memory formation rates across groups. Logistic Regression was used to 
analyze the frequencies of the judges’ ratings of interview transcripts (see Table 3). 
Binary logistic regression can be used to predict a dichotomous outcome variable – in this 
case either the presence/absence of memory or imagery - from a set of independent 
variables that may be continuous, discrete, dichotomous, or a combination thereof. 
Although discriminant analysis can also be used to predict group membership, this 
approach requires continuous (versus categorical) independent variables. Logistic 
regression is the preferred approach when independent variables are categorical – in this 
case, these were the three experimental conditions.  
The dependent variables examined were “memory versus no memory,” as well as 
“images plus memories versus no images or memories.” Analyses were conducted by 
creating dummy coded group contrast variables based on a priori hypotheses. To review, 
it was hypothesized that higher false memory formation rates would occur in “photograph 
from that time period” conditions as compared to the “no photograph” condition, and that 
the “no photograph” condition would yield higher false memory formation rates than 
would the “photograph taken during the event” condition. It was also hypothesized that 
higher false memory formation rates would occur in the “from that time period” context 
compared to the “photograph taken during the event” condition. In terms of the first 
hypothesis, at both Interview 1 and Interview 3, no significant differences were found in 
analyses on images plus memories (p = .455 and p =  .855, respectively) nor on memories 
alone (p = .105 and p = .292). Looking at memories alone, it is notable that at Interview 1, 
40% of participants in the “from that time period” condition developed memories as 
compared to 8.33% in the “no photo” condition. Nevertheless, as above, this difference  
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Table 2. 
Examples of transcripts falling into the No Images, Images only, or Memory categories 
No Images “Um, I don’t remember this at all. [SILENCE] I honestly have no recollection 
of ever taking a hot air balloon ride. [SILENCE]. No, I’ve got nothing. 
Images 
Only 
I don’t remember anything. *pause* I don’t know; I’m imagining me and my 
dad in a purple hot air balloon for some reason. And it’s raining outside but I 
don’t know who else is with us. Um… I think I would’ve been pretty excited. 
And at that age I probably thought we went pretty high off the ground, so it 
might’ve been a little bit scary too. Um… But I’m having trouble actually 
picturing actually being in that event because I don’t remember it. 
Memories I know my mom, my dad, my brother, and me were all together that day.  
Um… I remember, um, the hot air balloon having, um, being really colourful 
on the top. I, I think Sue and Becca were there, because I don’t remember 
going up in the hot air balloon with my mom, but I remember Sue being there. 
So maybe I went up with my mom and Becca went up with her mom, or, 
um… yeah, just me and my mom went up in the hot air balloon, but there was 
a man that was operating the hot air balloon. Um, he was trying to explain to 
me – well, in childish terms – trying to explain to me how the hot air balloon 
worked. Um, I remember being frightened because I didn’t understand how it 
would land once it went up. Just lots of people around. And I’m pretty sure 
that it was an event that had, like, a barbeque fundraiser thing going on too, 
because I’m pretty sure I remember eating a hot dog that day. That’s it. 
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Table 3. 
Percentage of image and memory formation for false event per judge’s ratings by 
experimental condition and time 
 Interview 1 Interview 3 
 None Images Memories None Images Memories 
No Photo 25.00% 66.67% 8.33% 41.67% 41.67% 16.67% 
Photo During Event 66.67%   16.67%    16.67% 66.67%     25.00%   8.33% 
Photo Time Period 40.00% 20.00%    40.00% 45.45%     18.18%    36.36% 
 
Note: No Photo, n at I1 = 12, n at I3 = 12; Photo During Event, n at I1 = 12, n at I3 = 12; 
Photo Time Period, n at I1 = 10, n at I3 = 11. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of memory formation for false event per judges’ ratings by 
experimental condition at Interview 3 
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Table 4. 
Percentage of image and memory formation for true events per judge’s ratings by 
experimental condition and time 
 Interview 1 Interview 3 
 None Images Memories None Images Memories 
No Photo 0.00% 13.89% 86.11% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Photo During Event 5.56%   25.00%    69.44% 0.00%     8.33%   91.67% 
Photo Time Period 10.00% 16.67%    73.33% 5.56%     19.44%    75.00% 
 
Note: No Photo, n at I1 = 12, n at I3 = 12; Photo During Event, n at I1 = 12, n at I3 = 12; 
Photo Time Period, n at I1 = 10, n at I3 = 11. Proportions are reported across all true 
events (3 per participant).
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was not statistically significant (B = .966; SE = 6.14; Wald = 2.63; p = .105, Exp(B) = 
2.71).  
Regarding the second hypothesis that the “no photograph” condition would yield 
higher false memory formation rates than would the “photograph taken during the event” 
condition, analyses on memories alone revealed no significant effects at either time (both 
p = .544). However, at Interview 1, 33.34% of participants in the “photograph taken 
during the event” context developed images or memories compared to 75% in the “no 
photo” condition (B = .896, SE = .453, Wald = 3.92, p = .048, Exp(B) = .408). This was a 
statistically significant difference. This difference was not maintained at Interview 3 (B = 
.515, SE = .424, Wald = 1.48, p = .224, Exp(B) = .598). 
Regarding the third hypothesis that higher false memory formation rates would 
occur in the wider “from that time period” context as compared to the narrower 
“photograph taken during the event” condition, at Interview 1, 33.34% of participants in 
the “photograph taken during the event” context formed images or memories, as 
compared to 60% in the “from that time period” context (B = .549, SE = .445, Wald = 
1.53, p = .217, Exp(B) = 1.73). At Interview 3, 33.33% of participants in the “photograph 
taken during the event” context formed images or memories, as compared to 54.54% in 
the “from that time period” context (B = .438, SE = .431, Wald = 1.03, p = .309, Exp(B) = 
1.55). Similarly, at Interview 3, 8.33% of participants in the “during the event” condition 
generated memories as compared to 36.36% in the “from that time period” condition. 
This difference was not statistically significant (B = .919; SE = 0.609; Wald = 2.28; p = 
.131, Exp(B) = 2.507).  
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Finally, at Interview 1, 40% of participants in the “from that time period” formed 
memories compared to 25% in the other two groups (B = 1.54; SE = .893; Wald = 2.98; p 
= .085, Exp(B) = 0.21). No significant differences were found at Interview 3 in this 
regard (B = 1.39; SE = .880; Wald = 2.48; p = .115, Exp(B) = 4.00). No significant 
differences were found for images plus memories at Interview 1 (B = .238; SE = .765; 
Wald = 0.10; p = .755; Exp(B) = 1.27) nor at Interview 3 (B = 0.35; SE = .73; Wald = 
.228; p = 0.63; Exp(B) = 1.42). 
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ)    
 Judge’s ratings provide an objective evaluation of false memory formation. They 
do not, however, take into consideration the participants’ subjective memory evaluations. 
Hypotheses for group differences on these ratings paralleled those of objective judges’ 
ratings. Given that the data violated the assumption of normality necessary for parametric 
tests, Mann-Whitney U planned comparisons were performed. Analyses failed to support 
the first two hypotheses in that no significant differences in memory ratings (i.e. the 
degree to which they claimed to remember the target event, as assessed by the ABMQ 
Memory item) occurred between the “no photo” condition compared to the “photograph 
taken during the event” condition (U = 47.00, p = .160) nor between the “no photo” and 
the “photograph taken during that time period” conditions (U = 49.00, p = .198). 
However, significantly higher memory ratings occurred in the “from that time period” 
context compared to the “photograph taken during the event” context (U = 30.00, p = 
.014), thus supporting the third hypothesis. Moreover, a significant difference was found 
between the “from that time period” group as compared to the “no photo” group 
collapsed with the “photograph taken during the event” group (U = 77.00, p = 0.024). 
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Although no significant differences were found between groups on general 
plausibility and belief, a linear trend for Personal Plausibility approached significance, 
F(1, 34),  p = .074, wherein the highest ratings occurred in the “from that time period” 
condition and the lowest in the no photo condition. A difference in Personal Plausibility 
ratings in the “from that time period” condition compared to the other two conditions 
combined was approaching significance F(1, 34) = 4.12, p = .051.                                                  
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ)  
All items of the MCQ tended toward the floor of the scale. Given that both 
homogeneity of variance and normality of distribution assumptions were violated, 
analyses of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (see Appendix J) ratings were 
conducted using the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. No significant differences were 
found between groups for all eight items at Interview 1 (p = 0.18 to p = 0.87) or at 
Interview 3 (p = 0.14 to p = 0.86). Planned comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests also 
revealed no significant differences at either time point (p = .31 to p = .98). To test for 
change over time between groups, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for all 
eight items. A significant within-subjects effect was found for the emotion item, F(1, 33) 
= 7.65; p =  .01). Also, a slight trend for change over time was found for “relive the 
event”, F(1, 33) = 2.79, p = .10, and for “see the event”, F(1, 33) =  3.15, p = .09. 
However, no between-groups effects were found (p = .17 to p = .73).  
Participants’ guesses 
 Finally, in terms of participants’ guesses about which event was false at the end of 
the third interview, only one participant guessed incorrectly. This participant was in the 
“photograph from that time period” context.  
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Study 1 Discussion       
 The primary purpose of Study 1 was to determine how the same true photograph 
introduced with different information about its frame of reference (i.e. whether it was 
taken during the event or during the time period that the event occurred) would 
differentially impact the breadth of memory retrieval models generated, and in turn, false 
memory formation. The findings suggest that a photograph introduced as representing the 
time period during which the false event took place generates higher false memory 
formation compared to one that is said to represent the actual event. Individuals in the 
former condition are free to use the vivid visual cues of the photograph as a springboard 
to generate their own, related visual imagery, rather than be limited to trying to generate a 
mental representation restricted to the visual cues in the photograph. That is to say, the 
manner in which the photograph is framed determines what one searches for, and in some 
framings, what is searched for is more narrow. Excessively narrow searches are 
problematic when it comes to retrieval (or fabrication), as they restrict access to 
autobiographical memory. This makes it more difficult to generate candidate mental 
products when trying to retrieve an event. The inability to generate a suitable mental 
product can then be deemed as diagnostic of event non-occurrence, and the event is more 
likely to be rejected.         
 A cue representing a narrower frame of reference refers to a single event, and thus 
preferentially favours activation at the ESK level. This knowledge level is most 
associated with imagery and a sense of “pastness” (Conway, 1992), and is thought to 
trigger autonoetic consciousness (a sense of recollectively experiencing the past or 
“mental time travel”), a key component in episodic remembering (Tulving, 1983). This, 
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Table 5:  
Means and standard deviation for all Autobiographical Belief and Memory 
Questionnaire (ABMQ) variables at Interview 3 
 General 
Plausibility 
Personal 
Plausibility Belief Memory 
 
Condition Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
No Photo 
 
 
5.00 
 
1.54 
 
4.50 
 
1.88 
 
3.58 
 
1.62 
 
2.00 
 
1.21 
Photo During Event 
 
4.42 1.98 4.67 1.78 4.00 1.86 1.50 1.45 
Photo Time Period 5.25 1.91 5.83 1.64 4.33 2.43 3.17 2.04 
 
Note: N for all conditions = 12 
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Figure 6.  Mean Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ) Memory 
ratings at Interview 3  
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Table 6. 
Means and standard deviation for all Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) 
variables at Interview 1 and Interview 3  
 
 Interview 1 Interview 3 
 No Photo Photo During Event 
Photo Time 
Period No Photo 
Photo During 
Event 
Photo Time 
Period 
 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 
Relive event 
 
 
1.25 
 
0.62 
 
1.17 
 
0.39 
 
1.58 
 
1.24 
 
1.42 
 
0.67 
 
1.42 
 
0.67 
 
1.92 
 
1.40 
See the event 
 
1.75 1.48 1.42 0.90 1.67 1.50 1.92 1.44 1.58 0.67 2.21 1.62 
Hear the event 
 
1.08 0.29 1.25 0.62 1.58 1.16 1.25 0.45 1.33 0.89 1.58 1.24 
Feel emotions 
 
1.58 0.79 1.33 0.49 1.29 0.75 2.08 0.90 1.92 1.08 1.71 0.86 
Remember/know 
 
1.33 0.89 1.17 0.58 1.63 1.46 1.25 0.62 1.33 0.65 1.92 1.62 
Coherent story 
 
1.00 0.00 1.08 0.29 1.54 1.47 1.17 0.40 1.25 0.87 1.71 1.51 
Believe occurred  
 
1.08 0.29 1.25 0.87 1.63 1.20 1.17 0.58 1.33 0.89 1.92 1.50 
Talked/thought 
 
1.08 0.29 1.00 0.00 1.08 0.29 1.42 1.44 1.17 0.58 1.33 0.89 
 
Note: N for all conditions = 12 
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in turn, gives the individual a sense of rapidly activated information about the qualitative 
characteristics of a retrieval product. If rapid, autonoetic, “reliving-the-moment” type 
processing does not occur, spreading activation will be too diffuse and the event is thus 
less likely to be endorsed as true. In other words, cues intended to preferentially activate 
ESK prompt the generation of a narrow memory search model and are held to the highest 
degree of scrutiny: either a stable pattern of activation must occur, or the working self-
concept “gate keeper” prohibits access to the autobiographical knowledge base.
 Conversely, the wider framing preferentially favours activation of the 
autobiographical knowledge base more so at the general events level, rather than at a 
specific single event level. A broader memory search model is generated, which fosters a 
more stable pattern of activation across the autobiographical knowledge base than does 
activation at the event-specific level. This is consistent with the previously-introduced 
concept of constraint, in that the wider framing confers less constraint on the ability to 
generate idiosyncratic event-related imagery. The freedom to imagine, as well as repeated 
imagination as occurred in the present study, serves to increase fluency of processing, 
familiarity, and vividness while decreasing awareness of the cognitive operations used to 
generate the image in the first place (Henkel, 2004). The result is that the features that 
distinguish imagined from experienced events become blurred and less distinct as 
markers of source, thereby promoting source monitoring errors (Henkel, 2004). A 
narrower framing, by contrast, attenuates the degree of imagery formed. As has been 
demonstrated previously, cues that constrain imagination decrease the likelihood of 
source monitoring errors thereby reducing opportunities for false memory formation (see 
Garry & Wade, 2005; Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012).      
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 Comparing the present findings with existing literature, it is notable that the “no 
photo” condition is similar to Garry and Wade’s (2002, 2005) and Lindsay’s (2004) 
narrative alone conditions. Additionally, the “photo during that time period” condition is 
similar to Lindsay’s (2004) true photograph condition and the “photo during event” 
condition is similar to Garry and Wade’s (2005) doctored photograph condition – with 
respect to the frame of reference within which the photograph is interpreted. In the 
present study, imagery and memory formation was higher in the “no photo” condition 
than in the “photo during the event” condition. However, this effect appeared to be 
largely driven by a large percentage of image formation in the “no photo” condition. This 
is consistent with Garry and Wade’s (2005) and Lindsay’s (2004) pattern of findings in 
that those in a narrative condition typically generated a greater percentage of imagery as 
compared to those in a photograph condition (doctored, event-specific and non-doctored, 
non-event-specific, respectively). This phenomenon is consistent with the argument that 
narratives confer a greater freedom to imagine event details idiosyncratically. In sum, the 
findings from the present study replicate those of Garry and Wade (2005) when 
comparing a false narrative to an event-specific false photograph. However, these 
findings extend the previous work by demonstrating that when the frame of reference is 
explicitly manipulated, the pattern of findings reverses. That is to say, the photograph that 
is interpreted as representing a broader (versus narrower) frame of reference confers 
greater false-memory promoting power compared to a narrative.     
 Although narratives alone confer greater freedom to imagine event details, this 
imagery generation does not become attributed to memory, as observed by low subjective 
memory ratings in this group. It is possible that imagery generation in this condition is 
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more effortful and requires significantly more cognitive operations (qualitative feature 
that is not typically associated with autobiographical memories) than it would in the 
context of an assistive photograph. Referencing the decrease in imagery generation across 
time in this condition, it appears that individuals initially do engage in the retrieval task 
and generate a mental representation of some kind. However, when this mental 
representation is evaluated according to metacognitive beliefs about memory, it does not 
meet the criterion threshold and thus the event is rejected. Alternatively, the lack of a 
suitable mental product is deemed to be diagnostic of event non-occurrence. As such, 
when presented with the narrative retrieval cue in the third session, a large percentage of 
individuals are simply not initiating a memory search as they have determined that the 
event did not occur.          
 Although not statistically significant owing to possible lack of power on account 
of a small sample size, both objective judges’ memory ratings and participants’ own 
subjective memory ratings were higher in the “during that time period” condition 
compared to the “no photo” condition. This is consistent with Lindsay’s (2004) findings 
in that their narrative with photograph condition resulted in a higher false memory 
formation rate compared to the narrative alone (i.e. no photo) condition. In the case of 
SMS, the broader frame of reference implied by the photograph encourages entry into the 
autobiographical knowledge base at the general event level. The resulting imagery – 
possibly more vivid on account of the rich visual and self-relevant cue of the photograph - 
is more likely to be deemed to be a memory than that formed secondary to a narrative 
alone, and thus the false event is more likely to be endorsed as true. In the case of SMF, 
the assistive photograph provides vivid perceptual details that enhance the images created 
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by the narrative. This phenomenon is termed “feature importation,” which involves taking 
phenomenological features from one source (i.e. photograph) and inserting into the 
mental product generated whilst trying to remember a target event (Henkel, 2011). In this 
manner, the mental product imagined acquires features that are characteristic of actual 
perceptual experience, thereby promoting source monitoring confusions. Additionally, 
this enhanced imagery promotes the more rapid, heuristic processes of retrieval, which is 
more likely to bring about source monitoring errors, and in turn increasing the likelihood 
of false memory endorsement.       
 Finally, both objective judges’ memory ratings and participants’ own subjective 
memory ratings were highest in the “photo during time period condition” as compared to 
the other two conditions combined. This finding was supported by significant differences 
in the ABMQ subjective personal plausibility ratings, in that individuals in the “photo 
during time period” condition considered the false event to be more personally plausible 
that did those in the other two conditions. In this condition, the narrative orients 
individuals to the vivid visual cues of the photograph, which in turn orients them to 
examine a particular time period when the event may have occurred. This condition 
allows for the rapid generation of mental products of sufficient quality to be deemed a 
memory, as reflected in the high false memory formation rate in the first session.  
 The ease of forming vivid and event-specific mental products– or fluency of 
processing – may have contributed to feelings of familiarity, thus making the event seem 
more autobiographically plausible. The perception of the plausibility of an event has been 
demonstrated to increase belief in the event’s occurrence (Mazzoni, Lofus & Kirsch, 
2001). Although no statistically significant differences in belief were noted, increased 
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personal plausibility, coupled with methods to enhance the quality of mental products (i.e. 
imagination, context-reinstatement, and guided imagery), increase the likelihood of false 
memory formation (Scoboria et al., 2004). The “no photo” photograph condition 
promotes the generation of mental products, but ones that lack the necessary qualitative 
characteristics to be labeled as memories, whereas the “photo during the event” condition 
restricts the freedom to generate mental products by virtue of the narrow frame of 
reference within which the photograph must be processed. The “photo during time 
period” condition seems to capitalize on the broader framing while using the narrative to 
anchor the memory search such that the generation of mental products is guided. This 
may serve to enhance the “feature importation” phenomenon noted above (Henkel, 2011).
 Again, on account of a possible lack of power due to the small overall sample 
size, the findings from the objective judges’ ratings were largely limited to trends 
approaching significance. Aside from a lack of power, a possible reason for trends 
observed in the objective rating not attaining significance may be that even if participant 
felt confident in their memory for the event (and gave a high memory rating), this 
subjective experience may not have been verbally expressed with sufficient descriptive 
detail so as to be coded as a memory by the judges. This highlights the importance of 
including both objective and subjective measures when conducting false memory 
research,. It is the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as remembering 
something that carries a larger weight in legal and therapeutic settings.  
 The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) was used primarily as an 
exploratory measure to help understand the qualitative factors (e.g. visual imagery, 
emotional content, event coherence) that may have influenced the ABMQ memory 
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ratings as participants engaged in the memory recovery task. Unfortunately, aside from a 
significant increase over time on item 4 (emotional content), no other differences were 
found. However, it is notable that emotional content is a primary characteristic associated 
with rich autobiographical memories (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007). As such, as they 
continued to re-engage with the experimental stimuli, participants endorsed an elevation 
in emotional experiencing associated with the event, which may have impacted their 
ABMQ memory endorsements.        
 Finally, the fact that at the end of the study, all but one participant guessed 
correctly as to which event was false bears comment. Possible explanations include the 
role of demand characteristics and participant compliance, in that participants may have 
inferred the purpose of the study and either consciously or unconsciously modified their 
responses in line with what they thought the experimenter wanted. However, it is notable 
that both objective and subjective measures of memory showed significant and predicted 
differences. Moreover, the patterns of imagery and memory generation in each condition 
are consistent with both theory and with existing literature. As such, it seems likely that 
individuals genuinely formed false memories, and that they provided verbal output and 
subjective ratings reflective of this. Moreover, once they made a decision to not reject the 
event (i.e. formed an even tentative belief in the event’s occurrence), confirmation bias 
may have played a role to entrench this belief and prevent event rejection. Confirmation 
biases inflate confidence in one’s beliefs such that these are strengthened and are resistant 
to change, even if presented with new evidence to the contrary.   
 Although definitive diagnostic conclusions about what truly occurred are not 
possible, the findings from the present study have important implications in terms of 
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external validity. To wit, in therapeutic and legal settings, participants own accounts as 
well as their subjective evaluation of their experiences is what carries the most weight. 
Put simply, if one claims that they remember something, and can provide enough 
descriptive detail to convince a therapist, a judge, or a jury that they remember, the origin 
and strength of that memory is rarely questioned.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Study 2 Method 
Participants and Setting 
Of the 300 participants invited to participate, 42 provided their parents’ contact 
information. Thirty-five responses from parents were received. Two participants were 
unable to be reached for scheduling. As such, the sample included 33 University of 
Windsor students (32 female) between the ages of 17 and 30 (M = 19.5, SD = 1.8). 
Participants received either cash ($20 for attending all three sessions) or academic credit 
as compensation for participation, and were also entered in a raffle for 2 prizes of an 
audio player. 
Design and Materials 
 Soliciting information from parents. These procedures were identical to those in 
Study 1. 
Booklets. Four photographs were selected from those provided and scanned in at 
high resolution. One of these photographs was doctored using Adobe Photoshop© and 
was accompanied by a narrative which described the hot air balloon ride.  A booklet was 
created, which contained four 4 X 6 black and white photographs, one on each page 
printed at high resolution (1200 dpi). All conditions included a brief description denoting 
the event, the age of the participant at the time, and a sentence describing what took 
place. Participants were told that photographs were black and white because the originals 
submitted needed to be scanned, digitalized, and returned to their parents in good 
condition and that the printer used only enables black and white printing. 
Creation of Conditions. Prior to the first session, participants were randomly 
assigned to the three experimental conditions: 1) Doctored, event-absent photograph 
 88 
(depicting the participant and parent, doctored to be posing against a nondescript 
background); 2) Doctored non-event-specific photograph (depicting the participant and 
parent, doctored to be posing again a nondescript background with an inserted hot air 
balloon floating in the sky); and 3) Doctored event-specific photograph (depicting the 
participant and parent posing inside the basket of a hot air balloon). All photographs were 
doctored using Adobe Photoshop©. The hot air balloon in both doctored photographs was 
the same stock image as that employed in the original Wade et al (2002) study, whereas 
the image of the participant and their parents was obtained from the photographs provided 
by parents. Regarding the latter, the original photograph provided by parents was altered 
to remove all content aside from the participant and their parent (i.e. other people, 
background, and the like). These images were then resized, shaded/brightened, and/or 
adjusted for relative spacing so as to fit into the stock image of the hot air balloon. In the 
second condition, it was presented in the immediate background behind the participant 
and their parent, whereas in the third condition, an image of the participant and their 
parent was inserted into the hot air balloon image. All three photographs were doctored. 
The configuration of detail in photographs is depicted in Figure 7. 
Measures 
          The measures were identical to those used in Study 1. Regarding the coding of 
audio taped session transcripts, judges attained an inter-rater agreement of 88% on the 
actual transcripts; disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
Procedure  
         The procedure was identical to that used in Study 1, the only difference being that 
no narratives were read aloud to the participant, and the photographs were not introduced 
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with any form of framing instruction as in the first study. Each photograph was placed in 
front of the participant, and they were asked to describe everything that they could 
remember about the event without leaving anything out. 
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Figure 7. Illustration of the three experimental conditions in Study 2. 
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CHAPTER V 
Study 2 Results 
Near the middle of data collection for this study, it was discovered that some 
participants were aware of the purpose of the study. The reason for this is that the 
textbook used in the fall term of the introductory psychology course discusses the original 
hot air balloon studies upon which the current work is based in detail. At the end of the 
procedure in this study, participants were subsequently asked to identify the purpose of 
the study prior being debriefed. Those who indicated that they had (i.e. identified that 
they thought it was a false memory study) were asked what had given them the 
impression that the study was exploring false memories. Response variously included 
reference to speaking, learning, or reading about such research in class. Some also made 
explicit reference to having seen what appeared to be the exact same stock hot air balloon 
photograph in a textbook. As the data quality for these participants is unusable, analyses 
were only conducted on the data set omitting participants identified as being aware of the 
study’s intent (i.e. valid participants; N = 19).  
Judges’ Ratings 
Overall images and memories formed. Analyses found that at Interview 3, 33% 
of participants were judged to have memories for the false event, compared to 5% at 
Interview 1, t (17) = 2.56, p = .030. Furthermore, 38% of participants were judged to have 
generated images or memories at Interview 3, as compared to 21% at Interview 1, t(17) = 
1.84, p = .083, although this difference was not statistically significant. 
False memory formation rates across groups. Logistic Regression was used to 
analyze the frequencies of the judges’ ratings of interview transcripts. To review from 
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above, it was hypothesized that doctored, event-absent photograph would yield higher 
rates of false memory formation as compared to doctored-event-specific photograph. It 
was also hypothesized that doctored, non-event specific photographs would yield the 
highest false memory formation rate as compared to both doctored, event-absent 
photographs and doctored, event-specific photographs.  
At both Interview 1 and Interview 3, the analyses revealed no significant effects in 
this regard, thus the hypotheses were not supported. The frequency of image and memory 
formation in the doctored, event-absent and doctored, event-specific groups was identical 
(42.86%), and the doctored, non-event specific group did not form any images or 
memories (0.00%). At Interview 1, 14.29% of participants in the doctored, event-absent 
group formed memories – the only group to form memories alone at this time point (see 
Table 7). 
At Interview 3, 42.86% of participants in the doctored, event-absent photograph 
condition formed images or memories as compared to 57.15% in the doctored, event-
specific photograph condition (B = .575, SE = 1.808, Wald = .284, p = .594, Exp(B) = 
1.778).  Regarding memory formation alone, 42.86% of participants in each condition 
formed memories.  
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ)  
Hypotheses for group differences on these ratings were the same as for the objective 
judges’ ratings. Given that the data violated the assumption of normality necessary for 
parametric tests, Mann-Whitney U planned comparisons were performed. Although 
analyses failed to support the hypotheses, nor were there any significant differences found 
between groups on plausibility and belief ratings, exploratory analyses revealed an 
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overall quadratic trend approaching significance for belief, F(1,18) = 1.36, p = .074). 
Pairwise comparisons using LSD post-hoc tests found a difference between the doctored, 
non-event-specific photograph condition and the doctored, event-specific condition that 
was approaching significance (p = 0.056) in that the participants in the latter condition 
gave higher ratings on this item than did those in the former. 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ)   
Given that both homogeneity of variance and normality of distribution 
assumptions were violated by all of the items, analyses of the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (see Appendix J) ratings were conducted using non-parametric tests.  
At Interview 1, differences approaching significant were found between groups for the 
following MCQ items: relive event, X2 (2, N = 19) = 5.75, p = .056); see event, X2 (2, N = 
19) = 5.75, p = .056); hear the event, X2 (2, N = 19) = 5.75, p = .056); and feel emotions, 
X2 (2, N = 19) = 5.74, p = .057). Planned comparisons to test hypotheses using Mann-
Whitney U tests revealed differences approaching significance in memory quality ratings 
for the above items in that participants in the doctored, event-absent photograph condition 
gave higher ratings than did those in the doctored, event-specific photograph condition, 
thereby providing partial support for the first hypothesis at Interview 1 (all U = 14.00, p = 
.061).  No differences in memory quality ratings were found between participants in the 
doctored, event-absent condition compared to the doctored, non-event-specific 
photograph condition, nor between participants in the doctored, non-event-specific 
photograph condition compared to the doctored, event-specific photograph condition (all 
p > 0.10).           
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Table 7. 
Percentage of image and memory formation per judge’s ratings by experimental 
condition and time – valid participants 
 
 Interview 1 Interview 3 
 None Images Memories None Images Memories 
Doctored, Event-
Absent 71.43% 14.29% 14.29% 57.14% 0.00% 42.86% 
Doctored, Non-
Event-Specific 100.00%   0.00%    0.00% 100.00%     0.00%   0.00% 
Doctored, Event-
Specific 71.43% 28.57%    0.00% 42.86%     14.29%    42.86% 
 
Note: Doctored, Event-Absent Photo, n at I1 = 7, n at I3 = 7; Doctored, Non-Event-
Specific, n at I1 = 5, n at I3 = 4; Doctored, Event-Specific, n at I1 = 7, n at I3 = 7. 
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Figure 8. Percentage of memory formation for false event per judge’s ratings by 
experimental condition at Interview 3 
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Table 8.  
Means and standard deviation for all Autobiographical Belief and Memory 
Questionnaire (ABMQ) variables at Interview 3 – Valid participants  
 
 General 
Plausibility 
Personal 
Plausibility Belief Memory 
 
Condition Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
Doctored, Event-
Absent  
 
 
4.43 
 
1.61 
 
4.57 
 
1.51 
 
3.86 
 
1.95 
 
1.71 
 
1.11 
Doctored, Non-
Event-Specific 
 
4.40 1.52 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Doctored, Event-
Specific 
4.71 2.14 4.29 2.56 4.86 3.24 1.29 0.76 
 
Note: Doctored, Event-Absent, N = 7; Doctored, Non-Event-Specific, N = 5; Doctored, 
Event-Specific, N = 7. 
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No significant differences were found between groups for all eight items at 
Interview 3 (all p > 0.1). Planned comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests also revealed 
no significant differences (all p > 0.1). Finally, aside from one group that showed slight 
deviation from rating items on the scale floor, there was zero variance for most of the 
items, As such, any analyses involving the Interview 1 data for these two groups 
(including contrasts between groups at Interview 1 and Interview 1/Interview 3 contrasts) 
could not be conducted. 
Participants’ guesses 
 Finally, in terms of participants’ guesses about which photograph was false at the 
end of the third interview, only one participant guessed incorrectly. This participant was 
in the doctored, event-specific photograph condition.  
Study 2 Discussion 
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to determine if there existed a “middle ground” 
between event-absent doctored photographs and event-specific doctored photographs, 
which capitalizes on the benefits while minimizing the detriments of each photograph 
type. An important caveat to the following discussion is that any explanations or 
conclusions are made very tentatively. Prior exposure to the experimental stimulus (i.e. 
the image depicting the original hot-air balloon study) was not experimentally 
manipulated and it is simply not known how many participants were in fact exposed to 
same. As such, it is entirely possible that the valid data in fact includes individuals who 
had been exposed to the false memory study/photograph in class and had figured out the 
purpose of the study – but who were not identified as such.     
 To review, doctored-event specific photographs imply a narrow framing for  
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Table 9. 
Means and standard deviation for all Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) 
variables at Interview 1 and 3  
 
 Interview 1 Interview 3 
 Doctored, 
Event-Absent 
Doctored, Non-
Event-Specific 
Doctored, 
Event-Specific 
Doctored, 
Event-Absent 
Doctored, Non-
Event-Specific 
Doctored, 
Event-Specific 
 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 
Relive event 
 
 
1.64 
 
1.21 
 
1.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.45 
 
1.04 
 
1.73 
 
1.19 
 
1.36 
 
0.67 
See the event 
 
1.64 1.21 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.45 1.04 1.55 0.93 1.45 0.93 
Hear the event 
 
1.64 1.12 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.45 1.04 1.18 0.40 1.18 0.60 
Feel emotions 
 
1.91 1.38 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.27 1.27 1.82 1.25 1.73 1.27 
Remember/know 
 
1.27 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.36 0.92 1.54 1.03 1.00 0.00 
Coherent story 
 
1.27 0.91 1.00 0.00 1.09 0.30 1.36 0.92 1.18 0.40 1.09 0.30 
Believe occurred  
 
1.46 1.21 1.09 0.30 1.00 0.00 1.55 1.04 1.36 0.67 1.45 1.04 
Talked/though 
 
1.09 0.30 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.36 1.21 1.00 0.00 
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memory retrieval as dictated by their content. That is to say, because they depict the 
target event, the implied frame of reference is that they were taken during the event. 
Additionally, despite conveying rich perceptual details, doctored, event-specific 
photographs constrain key aspects of processing (i.e. via the implication that the event 
occurred exactly as depicted and thus should be remember that way). The resulting 
memory search model is narrower, thereby attenuating the total amount and/or quality of 
images formed, and in turn lowering the overall percentage of ‘memory’ formed. 
Doctored, event-absent photographs, on the other hand, imply a broader framing within 
which to interpret the photograph. The breadth of the memory search model created in 
response to this cue allows for greater freedom to generate a mental representation of the 
target event. As Study 1 has demonstrated, this feature fosters false memory formation.  
In pursuit of a middle ground, a doctored, non-event specific photograph was 
thought to capitalize on the temporal narrowed frame of reference that would focus the 
generation of a memory search model. Simultaneously, owing to the fact that the 
participant was not depicted as engaging in the actual event, the level of constraint on 
processing would be reduced. That is to say, individuals would be free to use the visual 
cues in the photograph to generate an idiosyncratic image of what the event would have 
looked like. This type of photograph was thought to preferentially encourage activation of 
the autobiographical knowledge base at the general event level. Similarly, given that both 
self-relevant and target-event-related cues are presented in a non-specific format, the raw 
materials for idiosyncratic imagery generation, binding of elaborated retrieval cues with 
mental products, and subsequent source monitoring errors would be in place.  
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 Predicted differences in objective memory judgments and subjective memory 
ratings were not observed. By the end of the third interview, both those in the event-
absent and event-specific conditions were judged as having an equal frequency of 
memory formation. A possible explanation for this pattern of memory progression from 
Interview 1 to Interview 3 may be that – although not an ideal cue for autobiographical 
memory formation - the photographs in these two conditions were deemed more 
autobiographically believable than that in the non-event specific condition, as was found 
in the subjective belief ratings. As such, participants in the two former conditions 
continued to engage in attempts at memory retrieval, which contributed to verbal output 
that was deemed by objective raters to constitute a memory. Nevertheless, these 
individuals did not subjectively experience the mental products retrieved to be of 
sufficient quality to be deemed as memories, as was reflected in their subjective memory 
ratings. Conversely, those in the latter condition may have deemed the inability to 
generate any kind of mental representation to be diagnostic of event non-occurrence, 
deemed the event to be less autobiographically believable (as compared to the other two 
conditions) and thus they abandoned attempts at memory retrieval. This was reflected in 
both their verbal output and their own ratings of their memory for the event. 
 Overall, subjective memory ratings were at or near the scale floor. However, the 
doctored, event-specific photograph yielded the highest belief ratings, followed by the 
doctored, event-absent photograph, followed by the doctored, non-event-specific 
photograph. In the case of the former, the photograph constitutes a highly personalized 
suggestive cue compared to the former. Such cues have been demonstrated to promote 
false autobiographical belief formation (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry & Bernstein, 2012). 
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Quite simply, if an individual is shown a photograph that they are told was provided by 
their parents (credible source), and the photograph depicts them engaging in an event 
(personalized suggestion), they are likely to find the event autobiographically believable 
even if they do not endorse a memory for same. Unless given explicit reason for doing 
otherwise, individuals generally trust photographs as being legitimate. This evidentiary 
status of photographs bolsters their suggestive power to convince the viewer of the 
event’s occurrence (i.e. photograph inflation effect; Henkel, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 
2008). 
 Turning to the event-non-specific condition, it was thought that this photograph 
would yield an ideal memory retrieval model, whereas doctored, event-absent 
photographs would result in one that is too wide and doctored, event-specific photographs 
would result in one that is too narrow. Unfortunately, this condition did not yield any 
imagery or memory judgments, nor did it yield particularly high subjective belief ratings. 
One possible explanation is that the methodological manipulation was not as compelling 
for some reason. Although theoretically grounded, the specific manner in which the 
stimulus was constructed may have been a methodological flaw that could only have been 
discovered once data was collected. Perhaps instead of minimizing disadvantages and 
capitalizing on advantage inherent in the other two photograph types, this photograph 
ended up doing just the opposite. The doctored, non-event-specific photograph represents 
a substantial but fairly unsophisticated digital manipulation (i.e. involved the simple 
insertion of a hot-air balloon image into what otherwise looks like a legitimate 
photograph) compared to the other two conditions. In a culture where digital alteration is 
becoming increasingly common, individuals are aware of the ease with which details can 
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be inserted into otherwise true photographs, such that it may have been called out as false 
with greater ease. The doctored, event-specific photograph, on the other hand, involves a 
much more sophisticated and complex digital manipulation that may have conferred a 
degree of believability to it. Given that encountering such carefully digitally altered 
photographs of oneself is highly uncommon, even those who immediately concluded that 
they did not remember the event did not reject the veracity of the photograph.   
An alternative explanation deserving of equal consideration is that, contrary to 
what was theoretically hypothesized, this particular photograph did not represent an ideal 
memory retrieval cue. It was thought that, by providing a visual cue that contained 
components of the target event but did not actually depict the event, participants would be 
more free to generate their own idiosyncratic event-related imagery, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of source-monitoring errors. However, the manner in which the photograph 
was constructed may have nevertheless conveyed too much event-specificity for the cue 
to work as it had been intended to. Instead of being technically flawed as proposed above, 
it is the inherent message that is communicated by the photograph content that the event-
related mental image that is constructed must match the exact hot-air balloon in the exact 
way in which it was depicted. Albeit slightly less so than the actual event-specific 
photograph, it may nevertheless have been too specific, and thus not provided sufficient 
freedom to imagine the event entirely idiosyncratically. In fact, based on objective data, 
no mental products were generated in response to this cue at any time point.  
Assuming, however, that participants did form some types of mental products, but 
failed to provide sufficient verbal output to be objectively judged as imagery, it would 
appear that generating imagery was most difficult in this condition compared to the other 
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two. Effortful imagery generation involves a degree of cognitive operation - a qualitative 
feature that is typically not associated with autobiographical memories (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Conversely, if no mental products were indeed generated, 
Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) propose that the next step is to decide whether the absence of 
memory is diagnostic of the event not having occurred (Strack & Bless, 1994). This 
process is based on metacognitive beliefs that individuals have about memory, which 
include: 1) the more time that has elapsed between encoding and retrieval increases the 
likelihood of forgetting, so not having a sufficiently good mental product in such a case 
would not be diagnostic of non-occurrence; 2) events that occurred early in life (i.e. 
before the offset of childhood amnesia) are also likely to be forgotten; and 3) the more 
distinctive the event, the more likely is should be remembered, whereas less distinctive 
events are less likely to be remembered. Therefore, not remembering an event that is 
deemed to be fairly rare or unusual like a hot air balloon ride may suggest that the event 
did not actually occur and thus neither autobiographical beliefs nor memories were 
formed. 
Comparing the present findings to the existing literature, it is notable that the 
doctored, event-specific photograph is similar to Garry and Wade’s (2005) doctored 
photograph condition and to Hessen-Kayfitz and Scoboria’s (2012) self-relevant, 
unconstrained condition. Garry and Wade (2005) found that at the conclusion of three 
interviews, approximately 32% of participants in the photograph condition were judged 
as having a memory for the event and approximately 18% formed images alone. Hessen-
Kayfitz and Scoboria (2012) found an 18.65% frequency of memory formation and a 
28.41% frequency of imagery formation. In the present study, 42.86% of participants 
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were judged as having a memory for the event and 14.29% formed images alone. As 
such, these finding are consistent, if not superior to these studies.  
Overall, the present study demonstrates that individuals in the event-absent and 
the event-specific conditions were found to form memories at an equal frequency. These 
two groups also formed autobiographical beliefs in the event’s occurrence, with those in 
the doctored, event-specific photograph giving the highest ratings.  Providing a 
description sufficient to be judged as a memory by an objective judge, coupled with the 
subjective endorsement in autobiographical belief in the event’s occurrence (even in the 
absent of a subjective memory for same), has important implications. As noted in the first 
study, it is the extent to which an individual believes in the occurrence of an event that 
carries a larger weight in legal and therapeutic settings, as will be discussed below. 
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CHAPTER VI 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this work was to determine which type of photograph (non-event-
specific or event-specific) constitutes a superior retrieval cue. These two photograph 
types differ in both content (i.e. one depicts the target event and one does not) as well as 
in the frame of reference implied by that content, which in turn impact the breadth of the 
memory search model generated. Referencing the frame of reference, doctored event-
specific photographs imply that they are representative of the event exactly as it occurred, 
whereas non-event-specific photographs are not as restrictive in this regard. As such, to 
determine which is a superior retrieval cue, these two factors needed to be separated and 
studied in turn. 
Role of frame of reference on memory retrieval model 
The first study sought to examine how the manner in which a photograph is 
framed would influence false memory formation. The frame of reference implied by 
event-specific photographs is content-restricted. Because the event itself is depicted in the 
photograph, this type of photograph does not lend itself to searching for information 
beyond the specific moment depicted (i.e. other trips to amusement parks, other instances 
of being on a scary ride). In other words, a doctored, event-specific photograph has a very 
constrained frame of reference. Non-event-specific photographs, on the other hand, can 
be introduced as representative of the event itself, or of the time period during which the 
event occurred. This is because the event is not depicted therein, and thus nothing in the 
content of the photographs restricts the ability to introduce them as representative of 
either frame of reference. Given their malleability in this regard, true photographs were 
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used to study whether the frame of reference plays a role in generating a memory retrieval 
model that facilitates false memory formation.  
 The findings suggest that retrieval cues that favour the generation of a broader 
memory search model do play an important role in remembering. Both subjective and 
objective data demonstrated that the wider temporal frame of reference of the “from that 
time period” condition led to higher false memory formation compared to the narrower 
frame of reference of the “during the event” condition. As such, it cannot be simply 
concluded that merely adding a photograph to a false narrative will enhance false memory 
formation. It is the manner in which that photograph is framed when it is presented that 
determines how the photograph is processed (and the breadth of the resulting memory 
retrieval model generated), that is central to its facilitative power in enhancing or 
impeding false memory formation. A broader frame of reference allows for a photograph 
to be used/processed as an aide to enhance the natural, idiosyncratic imagery elicited by 
the narrative. Imagery is not restricted by trying to remember the event within the specific 
confines of the photograph. Rather, the photograph provides rich and vivid raw materials 
to complement the event-related imagery conjured up by the narrative (e.g. “Here is one 
park I’ve been to around this age; perhaps the event occurred here or perhaps it was 
elsewhere). A narrower frame of reference causes a photograph to be processed more 
rigidly, in that whatever mental products are generated must include the visual cues in the 
photograph (e.g. “Here is the park where the event occurred; I must remember the event 
as occurring in this park”).  
Overall, a photograph does not have to depict an event, nor even be viewed as 
being representative of the event, in order to exert a powerful influence on false memory 
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formation. Additionally, the pattern of imagery and memory formation over time suggests 
that a false narrative paired with a photograph representative of a wider temporal frame of 
reference results in rapid imagery and memory facilitation. Although both the no-photo 
and “photo time period” conditions both yield rapid imagery development, the latter 
theoretically yields a more stable pattern compared to the other two conditions. 
Additionally, the “photo time period” condition yielded immediate and stable memory 
formation. As noted above, this condition yielded the highest personal plausibility and 
belief ratings compared to the other two conditions, albeit not statistically significant. 
Although high ratings on these factors are not sufficient to produce false memories 
(Scoboria et al., 2004), the degree to which the mental representation is enhanced leads to 
the image now exceeding the threshold according to which mental products are evaluated, 
which in turn may serve to enhance the speed and stability with which false memories are 
formed.  
Role of photograph content on memory retrieval model 
The second study sought to determine whether there existed a “middle ground” 
between non-specific true photographs and event-specific doctored photographs that 
capitalizes on the benefits while omitting the detriments of each. The event-absent and 
the event-specific conditions yielded false memories at an equal frequency. These two 
groups also formed autobiographical beliefs in the event’s occurrence, with those in the 
doctored, event-specific photograph giving the highest ratings. This pattern of findings is 
not consistent with the original experimental hypotheses. As previously noted, 
conclusions drawn from the findings are intended to be cautious.   
 Regarding the doctored, event-absent photograph and the doctored, event-specific 
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photograph, it was originally hypothesized that the former would yield a higher false 
memory formation rate than the latter. The theoretical rationale for this has been outlined 
above. Briefly, the event-absent photograph conferred what was thought to be an 
advantage by allowing for the generation of idiosyncratic imagery whereas the event-
specific photograph was thought to constrain imagination to match the exact cue depicted. 
Comparing this condition with the “photograph from that time period” period condition 
of the first study, the photograph is visually the same. However, the provision of the 
narrative in the first study provides a storyline to guide how the visual cues in the 
photograph are pieced together to generate event-related mental products. Without the 
benefit of such a narrative, the participants in the event-absent condition may have had a 
more difficult time constructing mental products, thereby impacting their ability to form 
autobiographical beliefs to the extent that those in the event-specific condition could. 
Referencing the latter, the rigid specificity of the cue served to restrict the generation of 
idiosyncratic event-related mental products. However, the fact that the photograph 
displayed the participant engaging in the target event, coupled with the credible source 
information as well as a rationale about why events that occurred long ago are more 
difficult to remember, prevented the immediate rejection of the event despite initial 
difficulties in remembering. These factors, in concert, likely served to elevate the 
personal plausibility of the event. As previously noted, increased event plausibility has 
been empirically demonstrated to increase belief in the event having occurred (see 
Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002 for a review).  
 To test these phenomena, specifically comparing event-absent and event-specific 
photographs, a possible direction may be to pair a narrative with each photograph type. 
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That way, the narrative can guide the nature of the event-specific imagery that is 
generated, and the impact of each photograph type can be studied. Additionally, the 
facilitative impact of each photograph type can be further examined by presenting a 
narrative at session 1 followed by a photograph of either type at session 2, or vice versa. 
This is similar to Wade, Garry, Nash, and Harper’s (2010) recent study, wherein they 
presented participants with either a narrative followed by a doctored photograph, a 
doctored photograph followed by a narrative, narrative at both time points, or a doctored 
photograph at both time points. Findings suggested that highest false imagery and false 
memory formation occurred when a narrative was presented first, followed by a doctored 
photograph.  
 Moreover, given the unexpected findings regarding the doctored, non-event-specific 
condition, which was anticipated to yield the highest false memory formation, two 
possible conclusions were put forth. One was that the methodology was flawed such that 
the manipulation simply did not work. The second conclusion was that this condition 
actually created the most difficult task of imagery and memory formation for the reasons 
outlined above. A possible solution to the problem may be to show a true photograph of 
the participant with their parent (i.e. event-absent photograph) plus a separate photograph 
of a park with hot-air balloons. This eliminates any rejection based on perception of 
image doctoring, thereby addressing the first conclusion for the finding, while retaining 
the theoretical integrity of the manipulation in that the self-relevant and event-relevant 
“raw materials” are presented. The other two conditions can remain the same and a 
comparison can be made between all three. Additional related future research directions 
will be discussed below. 
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Summary and implications         
 In sum, findings from the first study support the hypothesis that a wider frame of 
reference plays a facilitative role in false memory formation as compared to one that is 
quite narrow, as it fosters the generation of a more inclusive memory search model. It is 
important to note that these findings do not imply a linear relationship between the width 
of the temporal frame of reference and false memory formation. In fact, both SMS and 
SMF suggest that there exists a threshold beyond which further widening of the temporal 
frame of reference will serve to impede memory formation. To illustrate, asking an 
individual if they remember singing at a bar in the first semester of graduate school; at a 
bar while in graduate school, or at a bar when they were in their 20’s represents an 
increasingly wider temporal frame of reference. As the frame widens, the quality of the 
cue becomes less powerful such that a memory is less likely to be accessed.  
These findings are also important because they carry greater external validity that 
do doctored photographs – despite the increasing popularity and use of digital imaging 
software. That is, in therapeutic and legal settings, individuals are unlikely to encounter 
photographs that are digitally altered to such an extent as to depict them doing something 
that they did not do. In the case of therapy settings, they may peruse old family albums or 
family videos. In legal settings, they may view crime scene photographs (images after a 
crime has been committed, not images of the crime being committed) or photographs of 
potential suspects (who are not engaging in the criminal act, of course). In either case, 
individuals may be looking at these visual information sources in the context of a 
suggestion (i.e. “somebody in your family abused you - who could it have been?,”  or, 
“the person who committed the crime had black hair, one of the people in these 
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photographs did the crime – which one was it?”). Evidently, a photograph does not have 
to depict an event in order to exert a powerful influence on false memory formation. 
In general, conclusions about the findings in the second study must be made more 
cautiously in light of the unanticipated experimental confound. Indeed, no definitive 
findings were revealed vis a vis memory formation. Nevertheless, personal plausibility 
and autobiographical belief emerge as important factors common to both studies. As 
above, in the first study, the photograph with the wider temporal frame of reference also 
yielded the highest personal plausibility and belief ratings as compared to the other two 
conditions, albeit not statistically significantly different. In the second study, the 
doctored, event-specific photograph condition yielded the highest personal plausibility 
and belief ratings.  
Belief in the occurrence of an event and memory for an event are separate entities 
(Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 2004). In fact, research has demonstrated that 
experimental manipulations can impact belief but not memory ratings (Hart & Schooler, 
2006; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen & Fisico, 2007). Thus, one can believe something 
occurred, even if they have no memory for that occurrence (e.g. although one generally 
does not remember being born, most individuals believe that this event occurred).  
When false memories do form, autobiographical beliefs do as well (Desjardins & 
Scoboria, 2007; Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2011). Autobiographical beliefs are an 
important construct, in that it has been demonstrated that it is the belief in an event’s 
occurrence that motivates behavior change – whether or not a memory has developed 
(Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry & Bernstein, 2012; Geraerts, Bernstein, Merckelbach, Linders, 
Rayemaekers, & Loftus, 2008). Bernstein, Laney, Morris, and Loftus (2005) found that 
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by falsely suggesting that individuals had gotten sick on food during childhood led to an 
alteration in attitude toward anticipated future behavior of eating that food. However, 
these findings concern anticipated behavior. Scoboria, Mazzoni, and Jarry (2008) found 
that suggesting false past events serves to influence actual future behaviors. Berkowitz, 
Laney, Morris, Garry, and Loftus (2008) similarly found that suggesting to participants 
that they had had a negative versus a positive experience at Disneyland involving one of 
the characters influenced future behaviors (e.g. not being willing to pay as much for a 
Pluto souvenir). Moreover, the influence of false beliefs has been demonstrated to persist. 
Gerarts, Bernstein, Merckelbach, Linders, Raymaekers, and Loftus (2008) demonstrated 
that providing participants with a false suggestion that they had gotten ill on egg salad 
contributed to an intent to avoid this food, as well as significantly reduced their 
consumption of this type of food – both immediately as well as 4 months later.  
Event plausibility, in turn, has been demonstrated to play an important role in the 
formation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories (Scoboria et al., 2006). 
Mazzoni & Kirsch (2002) have argued that the plausibility of an event is evaluated to 
determine the degree to which it could have occurred, which then dictates a decision to 
either suspend or engage further retrieval efforts. Moreover, Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, 
and Shapiro (2012) recently demonstrated that only extremely implausible events were 
rejected. However, if the suggestion caused even a one-point increase above the floor 
level of plausibility, this contributed to notably stronger belief ratings. The implication 
here is that even events that are initially deemed relatively implausible can result in 
strong belief endorsements, provided they are not to be so implausible so that their status 
as impossible is maintained following the provision of other information supportive of the 
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possibility of the occurrence of the event. Although possibly an improbable event, the 
hot-air balloon ride event is arguably not an impossible event – as compared to, say, 
seeing a live dinosaur or flying.  Thus, it appears that false belief formation can occur 
with relative ease, provided that plausibility is enhanced.  
 False belief formation in and of itself is not necessarily always a bad thing. In fact, 
research has shown that false beliefs about fattening food can result in healthy 
consequences (Bernstein, Lainey, Morris & Loftus, 2005). Similarly, false beliefs about 
past negative experiences involving alcohol consumption can influence alcohol 
preferences (Clifasefi, Bernstein, Mantonakis & Loftus, 2013). Research on 
confabulations (i.e. strongly held false beliefs) suggests they may shape one’s perception 
of reality in a more positive direction, a sort of “wish-fulfillment bias” (Turnbull, Jenkins 
& Rowley, 2007). Although reminiscent of Quixotic themes of the triumph of 
irrationality and idealism versus reality (and despair), this is consistent with Conway’s 
(2005) proposition that motivated confabulation can be a means of maintaining self-
coherence.  
However, the formation of false beliefs also has a dark side. An example of the 
deleterious impact of false beliefs can be found in legal setting, specifically regarding the 
circumstances that contribute to false confessions. Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) 
propose three psychologically distinct types of false confessions: 1) voluntary false 
confessions; 2) coerced-compliant false confessions; and 3) coerced-internalized false 
confessions. The latter type is most rare, and occurs when individuals come to believe 
that they have committed crimes of which they are truly innocent. A perusal of the 
literature shows no shortage of real-life case examples (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1992; 
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Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1990; Kassin, 1997; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994) bolstered by 
controlled laboratory research demonstrating that not only that individuals can be induced 
into giving a false confession, but that they form a belief about their guilt despite being 
innocent (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 2003; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Redlich 
& Goodman, 2003).  
One explanation for this phenomenon lies in certain interrogation styles (e.g. the 
Reid Technique; Inbau, Reid, Buckley & Jayne, 2001), which contain techniques that 
ultimately seek out to undermine individuals’ confidence in their own innocence, promote 
a sense of confusion and heightened suggestibility whereby individuals come to question 
themselves, their memory, and their beliefs (Gudjonnson, 1992). Interrogation tactics 
employ various strategies which have been demonstrated to impact the formation of false 
autobiographical beliefs (Conti, 1999), including visualization and imagination (Garry & 
Polaschek, 2000). Interrogation techniques wherein individuals are exposed to 
information that they had no prior knowledge of, such as viewing photographs, 
descriptions of the crime (Henkel & Coffman, 2004), coupled with the suggestion of 
culpability, has been demonstrated to foster source misattributions (Johnson et al, 1993) 
in that individuals can come to attribute the source of information (i.e. knowledge of the 
crime details) to one source (i.e. having committed the act) versus another (i.e. having 
been given the information during the interrogation).  
Although individuals can form false memories of having committed a crime, it is 
remarkable that merely forming a belief of same is sufficient to elicit a false confession. 
An important factor in enhancing susceptibility to misinformation is the authority or 
credibility of the source of said information (Toglia, Ross & Ceci, 1992). More recently, 
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Scoboria, Wysman, and Otgaar (2012) have highlighted the importance of source 
credibility as a critical component of false belief formation. Participants asked to 
remember a set of false events endorsed higher belief for the occurrence of these events 
when told that all the events had been provided by parents (full source credibility) versus 
being told that some had been provided by parents (incomplete source credibility).  
Moreover, inclusion of true events as well as false events served to enhance the 
credibility of the source (i.e. was taken as proof that parents had indeed been contacted 
and provided information) thereby increasing false belief endorsement, even when 
participants were told that only half of the events had been provided by parents. These 
results demonstrate the true power of credible source suggestion.  
The ease with which false beliefs can be formed also has important implications in 
therapeutic work. Indeed, source credibility is at least one factor, coupled with a rationale 
normalizing the forgetting of events (and motivation to remember), that played a major 
role in the events that led to the genesis of this body of research – namely, false memories 
of child sexual abuse “recovered” during therapy. Additionally, a strong suggestion from 
a well-meaning therapist based on an interpretation of a set of diffuse symptoms was 
made. Another source of suggestion oftentimes came from “The Courage to Heal” (Bass 
& Davis, 1988), a book that was a common therapeutic resource at the time preceding the 
development of the infamous false memory cases. Written by individuals with no 
professional psychology training, the book was dedicated to aiding the recovery of false 
memories of child sexual abuse (Merskey, 1998). It included statements normalizing the 
forgetting of memories of abuse, asserting that the absence of memory should not be 
taken to mean the absence of abuse, and normalizing that it is difficult to believe that 
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abuse really occurred in the absence of a memory for it. These and other statements 
directly address the metacognitive beliefs that individuals have about memory (Mazzoni 
& Kirsch, 2002) and encourage individuals to not consider lack of memory as being 
diagnostic of event non-occurrence. These suggestive influences, paired with therapeutic 
tasks informed by the forgone conclusion that abuse occurred and thus memories must be 
recovered, contributed to the formation of false memories. 
Given the above, clinicians are wise to keep in mind the ease with which false 
memories and false beliefs can be formed. Individuals come to therapy seeking 
understanding or an explanation for symptoms, thereby creating an environment ripe for 
the formation of a false belief or memory in the context of a carelessly offered suggestion 
or hypothesis. Certain clinical populations are particularly susceptible to suggestion. For 
example, individuals who have dissociative disorders are characterized as having a 
disruption in memory, identity, and perception which make it more difficult for them to 
distinguish actual autobiographical events from fictitious ones. Indeed, higher levels of 
dissociation have been found to be associated with memory errors and false memory 
formation in a variety of studies (e.g. Dorahy, 2001; Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2002; 
Wright & Osborn, 2005).        
 Reduced capacity for reality monitoring also serves to increase vulnerability to 
forming false beliefs about events (Hyman & Billings, 1998). Psychiatric populations 
suffering from delusions, with or without the presence of hallucinations, are generally 
less accurate at identifying source of information, with the former exhibiting a higher 
propensity for reality monitoring errors as compared to the latter as well as to non-clinical 
controls (Bentall, Baker & Havers, 2011). Indeed, some research suggests that in some 
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cases, individuals with psychotic delusions may have brain pathology similar to that of 
confabulating organically brain damaged individuals (Johnson & Raye, 2000). Children 
are also vulnerable to forming false beliefs and memories, even for events that are highly 
implausible and surreal (Strange, Sutherland & Garry, 2006), or truly bizarre, ritualistic 
sexual abuse (e.g. People v. Akiki, 1993; State v. Michaels, (1994).  
Limitations and Future Research 
 An obvious limitation is that individuals are becoming increasingly aware of 
digital imaging technology in a broad sense. Moreover, the concept of false memory 
formation is no longer a completely novel phenomenon, and thus is increasingly 
presented in introductory psychology textbooks. These factors, in concert, suggest that 
the shelf-life of the “lost-in-the-shopping-mall” paradigm – as it has been employed in the 
literature to date – has been reached. Consultation with primary researchers in the false 
memory field (indeed, the pioneers of the “lost-in-the-shopping-mall” paradigm) has 
revealed that owing to increasing publicity (in general media, high school, and 
introductory psychology courses), they have found that more people are aware of this 
type of research. Researchers lose a fair percentage of participants who come to 
disbelieve the doctored photograph and/or become aware of the true nature of the 
research such that some have altogether abandoned this paradigm in search of alternative 
methodologies (Stephen Lindsay, Don Read; personal communications; March 2013).    
 Another limitation relates to the methodology, specifically referencing the 
procedure around debriefing. To review, at the conclusion of the third interview, 
participants are told that one of the events is false and are invited to guess which one it 
may be. A disadvantage of this approach is that revealing that one of the events is false 
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prevents an accurate assessment of whether or not the participant was aware of the true 
nature of the study. A possible alternative is to simply ask the participant what they 
thought the study was about initially, followed by the original method. Through this 
approach, a more valid determination of the presence of demand characteristics or 
compliance can be made. If participants fail to correctly identify the true nature of the 
study, but do correctly identify the false event, this would further illustrate the importance 
of even very tenuously-held beliefs and memories. This would inform therapeutic and 
legal practice in that specific queries may need to be made regarding a seemingly 
recovered or remembered account to ensure that it is not in fact a false memory. 
 Additionally, the fact that almost all participants guessed which photograph is 
false in both studies may reflect another limitation in the methodology. Again, it is 
notable that the patterns of imagery and memory generation in each condition in both 
studies are consistent with both theory and with existing literature, which suggests that 
individuals genuinely formed false memories, and that they provided verbal output and 
subjective ratings reflective of this. However, regarding the second study, it is possible 
that the doctored photograph looked more doctored as compared to the three photographs 
representing the true events. It may be the case that the photograph is least vivid 
compared to the others, and thus requires the most cognitive operations to process. In 
retrospect, conducting a pilot study or even asking individuals who are not depicted in the 
photographs (and who are unaware that any photographs have been doctored) to assess 
the degree to which the photographs look “real” would have allowed for the preliminary 
diagnosis of any flaws in the quality of the materials. 
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 Another limitation of the study relates to the gender breakdown of the sample. 
The first study included only seven males, and the valid participants in the second were 
all female. Gender differences in autobiographical memory have in fact been observed 
(St. Jacques, Conway & Cabeza, 2011). Thus, the conclusions drawn from the data must 
include the necessary proviso that they may not be completely generalizeable to males.  
As outlined previously, addressing the possible methodological flaw in the second 
study may be to show a true photograph of the participant with their parent paired with an 
entirely separate photograph of a park with hot-air balloons. This eliminates any rejection 
based on perception of image doctoring, while retaining the theoretical integrity.   
Another approach, reminiscent of Bransford & Johnson’s (1972) study, may be to 
include narratives that describe components of an event, but that cannot be fully 
understood without an accompanying photograph. For example, the narrative could 
describe the basket in detail, the fear of peeking over the edge, the friendly man operating 
the fire – all without explicitly referring to a hot air balloon ride. Participants would be 
asked to try to remember the event initially, and would only be supplied with an 
accompanying photograph of a hot air balloon in a later session. This approach is also 
reminiscent of more recent research examining the role of photographs on making 
inferences from narratives, which suggests that photographs that are consistent with 
conclusions implied (but not explicitly stated) in narratives lead individuals to 
erroneously assert that the conclusions were presented in the narrative (Henkel, 2012).  
 Current research directions into examining the mechanisms by which false events 
come to be accepted as true include focusing on the formation of false beliefs. As 
outlined above, inducing false beliefs occurs much more rapidly than inducing false 
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memories, and carries similar implications. Other research employs the use of digitally 
altered video which has been demonstrated to impact both beliefs and memories (Nash, 
Wade & Lindsay, 2009), as well as elicit false confessions (Nash & Wade, 2009) and 
even false accusations (Wade, Green & Nash, 2010). Additional directions attempting to 
study the formation of false memories can include the “lost in the shopping mall” 
paradigm, albeit avoiding the hot air balloon ride target event. Alternatively, the paradigm 
can be further adapted such that it involves embedding a false event of variable 
plausibility into a true event of varying salience. A memorable true event will elicit 
familiarity and fluency of processing of the memory cue, such that the embedded false 
event may be accepted as being true by virtue of these activated processes. 
 As is apparent, the field of false memory formation is moving into another 
generation. The focus of the initial query was whether false memories could indeed be 
fabricated and to what extent. Subsequent foci included an exploration of which types of 
media constitute superior suggestive cues. At present, the focus is about fine-tuning our 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms by which the well-established media operate 
to induce false memories. As with any generational progression, new challenges arise that 
necessitate the revision, rethinking, and re-invention of the manner in which phenomena 
can be explored to further deepen the understanding of what drives the machinery. 
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Appendix A – Sample doctored event-specific/non-specific photograph 
Sample family photograph and an example of how it was modified according to the 
doctored, event-specific photograph condition. The same hot-air balloon image was used 
for the doctored, non-event-specific condition. 
 
 
 
Note. Photograph taken from Wade & Garry (2005) 
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Appendix B – Recruitment message to be e-mailed to eligible participants 
 
 
 
 
 Hello, 
You are being contacted because, based on your answers to the Psychology 
Participant Pool Screening Questions, you have met the criteria for the study entitled 
“Remembering Childhood Events”. This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of 
various techniques used in trying to assist in the recovery of childhood memories.   
 If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following 
things: 
 
• You will be asked to provide consent for researchers to contact your parents to 
obtain photographs of you when you were a child.  
• Upon receipts of information from your parents, you will then be asked to attend 
three (3) separate sessions over the course of approximately one (1) week. During 
these sessions, you will be asked to remember a variety of non-sensitive childhood 
events. If you are unable to remember any event, you will be provided guidance in 
attempting to recall them. 
• All of your answers will be audio-taped in order to be able to assess the quality of 
your memories for each event. You will be asked to answer some questions 
regarding the quality of your memory for each of the events.  
 
The first session will last 60 minutes; the second and third sessions will last 
approximately 30 minutes, with a total participation time requirement of 2 hours. You 
will be eligible to receive 3 participation credits if you attend all three sessions. 
 Please note that you will not be officially enrolled in the study until the 
information requested is obtained from your parents and you are scheduled into you 
respective sessions.  
 
If you agree to this, please provide the following contact information for your parents: 
 
E-mail: _____________________________ 
 
Telephone: ______________________________ 
 
Address: _______________________________________ 
          
 
 Thank you for your cooperation. You will be contacted to set up an appointment 
once the necessary materials have been obtained from your parents. 
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Appendix C – Letter of Information for Parents 
 
 
 
 
LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR PARENTS 
 
 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
Your child, ___________________________________________, is participating in a 
study of childhood memory at the University of Windsor. She or he has provided 
permission for you to provide events that occurred to her/him.  We would appreciate if 
you would take a few minutes of your time and provide a number of photographs along 
with descriptions of a number of events which occurred to your child prior to the age of 
6.   
 
Please review the categories provided below.  If you know of any event(s) which your 
son/daughter experienced prior to the age of six in any category, please provide 
information about the activities which took place, the location, the people involved, and 
your child’s age at the time. Please provide photographs from a variety of different 
events. I would appreciate if you would provide as many photographs and corresponding 
descriptions as possible (minimum of 5), whether or not they fit the categories provided.  
We would appreciate if you are able to provide photographs that your child has not seen. 
 
Categories: 
• Birthday parties 
• Family gatherings (barbecues, birthdays, trips) 
• Family weddings 
• Trips to amusement parks 
 
For example, an event might be written: At the age of 4, at a friend of the family’s 
wedding, spilled the punch bowl onto the father of the bride. 
 
Additionally, we would like you to indicate which of the following events your child has 
experienced prior to the age of 6. Please place a checkmark beside each event that your 
child has experienced: 
 
• Getting lost in a shopping mall 
• Spending the night in a hospital due to an ear infection 
• Taking a hot-air balloon ride 
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• Losing a favorite toy 
• Choking on a small object. 
 
We request that you do not discuss this letter, nor the information you have provided, 
with your child until such a time as the study has been completed. As is sometimes 
necessary in psychological research, a mild form of deception will be employed in this 
study. However, all procedures to be employed have been approved by the University of 
Windsor Research Ethics Board and present no risk of discomfort to the participants. The 
photographs provided will be copied so that the originals are not damaged. They may be 
used, in whole or in part, and along with other pictures, to aid the participant in 
remembering various autobiographical events. This study will help inform the current 
state of knowledge regarding memory recovery techniques, which play an important role 
in therapeutic and legal settings. 
 
Upon the completion of their participation in the study, both you and your child will 
receive a full explanation of the purpose of the study. All of the pictures you have 
provided in their original condition, as well as a copy of the list of events you have 
provided will be returned to your child upon completion of the study.   
 
Please return the form to us using the pre-addressed envelope enclosed.  Or, if you have 
digitalized photographs, you may email your response to hessen@uwindsor.ca.  Please 
include your child’s name and the student number indicated on the form should you 
choose to email your response. 
 
Thank you for your assistance. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
________________________ 
Joanna Hessen-Kayfitz 
Psychology Department 
University of Windsor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
Appendix D – General Consent Form 
 
 
 
 CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of Study: Remembering Childhood Events 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Joanna Hessen, M.A. (PhD 
student) from the Department of Psychology at the University of Windsor. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Joanna 
Hessen-Kayfitz (Principal Investigator) at hessen@uwindsor.ca, or Dr. Alan Scoboria 
(Faculty Supervisor) at (519)253-3000, ext. 4090. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of various techniques used in trying to 
assist in the recovery of childhood memories.  
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things: 
- You will be asked to provide consent for researchers to contact your parents to obtain 
photographs of you when you were a child.  
- Upon receipt of information from your parents, if invited to take part you will then be 
asked to attend three (3) separate sessions over the course of one (1) week. During these 
sessions, you will be asked to remember a variety of non-sensitive childhood events. If 
you are unable to remember any event, you will be provided guidance in attempting to 
recall them. 
- Your answers to the first and third sessions will be audio-taped to assess the quality of 
your memories for each event. You will be asked to answer some questions regarding the 
quality of your memory for each of the events.  
- The first session will last 60 minutes; the second and third sessions will last 
approximately 30 minutes, with a total participation time requirement of no more than 2 
hours. The three interviews will take place over the period of one week. The fist and third 
interviews will be digitally audiorecorded. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
This study does not carry with it any foreseeable risks, discomforts, or inconveniences.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
There are no individual benefits from the participation in this study. Potential benefits to 
science and society expected from this research are such that the effectiveness of certain 
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common memory recovery techniques will be assessed. This plays a role in determining 
the most effective use of these techniques in therapy sessions, where the remembering of 
a given childhood memory is an important part of the therapeutic process.  
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
You will receive 3 bonus points towards the Psychology Participant Pool, assuming you 
are registered in the Pool and are enrolled in an eligible course.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified 
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. 
 
Your name will only be retained for the purpose of contacting your parents, to remind 
you of your interview session times, for assigning credits, for connecting your data across 
sessions, and for contacting you regarding the results of the draw. Data will be given an 
identification code. After the study is over, any personally identifying information will be 
destroyed.  
 
The interview sessions will be taped and transcribed for the purpose of studying your 
memory for each event. Once transcribed, the audio files will be destroyed. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, 
you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to 
answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still remain in the study.  The 
investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so. If you are uncooperative during this study, your participation may be 
terminated.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
 
Research findings will be made available to all interested parties upon completion, on the 
Research Ethics Board web site (www.uwindsor.ca/REB) approximately in April, 2012. 
Please provide your e-mail if you would like to receive a notification when the results 
become available for you to view.  
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
This final data will be retained for potential future analyses. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without 
penalty. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:  
Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; 
Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:  ethics@uwindsor.ca 
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SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
I understand the information provided for the study Remembering Childhood Events as described herein.  My 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have been given a copy of 
this form. 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Subject 
 
______________________________________   ___________________ 
Signature of Subject       Date 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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Appendix E – Audio-taping Consent Form 
 
 
 
CONSENT FOR AUDIOTAPING 
 
Research Subject Name:    
 
Title of the Project: Remembering Childhood Events 
 
I consent to the audio-taping of interviews, procedures, or 
treatment. 
 
I understand these are voluntary procedures and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time by requesting that the taping be stopped.  I also 
understand that my name or will not be revealed to anyone and that taping 
will be kept confidential. Tapes are filed by number only and store in a 
locked cabinet. 
 
I understand that confidentiality will be respected and the viewing of 
materials will be for professional use only. 
 
 
____________________________________________________________
______
______
______
_ 
        (Research Subject)          (Date) 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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Appendix F – Participant Debriefing 
 
 
 
 
The study you have just taken part in has been designed to look at the effects of varying 
different types of details contained in photographs on the likelihood that an event will be 
remembered.  
 Everybody in the study was asked to provide consent to contact their parents so 
that they could provide the researcher with childhood photographs of the participant. For 
each participant, a personalized booklet was made, containing the photographs that were 
provided by parents. Obviously, each participant had different photographs in their 
booklet. However, the third photograph, which depicted a hot-air balloon ride, was the 
same for all participants. This was not a true event, and the photograph depicting this 
event was doctored using photograph imaging software. Because your parents had 
indicated on the form that you had in fact gone on a hot-air balloon ride, you were 
disqualified from participating, as this would have confounded the results of the study. 
 Research has shown that individuals can be made to remember events that never 
actually happened to them. Many studies have used narratives as the suggestive medium, 
where the participants were provided a story that was allegedly obtained from a member. 
This story contained a false event, and participants developed varying degrees of memory 
for this event. More recent studies have used doctored photographs as the suggestive 
medium, where, much like this study, researchers doctor a photograph that was obtained 
by participants’ parents to make it look as though the participant is engaging in an event 
that they never actually experienced. These studies as a whole are designed to examine 
how individuals come to remember events that never actually happened to them. This 
particular study varied the types of details that were contained in photographs; each 
participant had an equal opportunity to be assigned to one of four conditions that 
contained different types of details. 
 This line of research has important implications in areas where photographs and 
other suggestive tools are used to assist in the recovery of long-forgotten memories, such 
as in therapy, law enforcement, and judicial settings. 
 Thank you for taking part. We would really appreciate if you would refrain from 
discussing this study with anyone. We plan to collect data over an extended period of 
time, and it would be a problem if people coming to the study were aware of what we are 
studying.  
 As a standard precaution, if this study has resulted in any distress or discomfort on 
your part, please inform the study administrator at the current time. You may also contact 
Dr. Scoboria at any time, now or hereafter (see below), or contact the Student 
Counselling Center at 253-3000 ext. 4616. 
 If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Joanna Hessen-
Kayfitz, the principal investigator, at hessen@uwindsor.ca, or Dr. Alan Scoboria, the 
faculty supervisor, at scoboria@uwindsor.ca, or at 253-3000 ext. 4090. 
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Appendix G – Debriefing letter for parents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information regarding the research study 
your son or daughter participated in recently, and for which you provided photographs. 
 
The study your child has taken part in has been designed to look at the effects of varying 
different types of details contained in photographs on the likelihood that an event will be 
remembered.  
 
Everybody in the study was asked to provide consent to contact their parents so that they 
could provide the researcher with childhood photographs of the participant. For each 
participant, a personalized booklet was made, containing the photographs that were 
provided by parents. Obviously, each participant had different photographs in their 
booklet. However, the third photograph, which depicted a hot-air balloon ride, was the 
same for all participants. This was not a true event, and the photograph depicting this 
event was doctored using photograph imaging software. 
 
Research has shown that individuals can be made to remember events that never actually 
happened to them. Many studies have used narratives as the suggestive medium, where 
the participants were provided a story that was allegedly obtained from a member. This 
story contained a false event, and participants developed varying degrees of memory for 
this event. More recent studies have used doctored photographs as the suggestive 
medium, where, much like this study, researchers doctor a photograph that was obtained 
by participants’ parents to make it look as though the participant is engaging in an event 
that they never actually experienced. These studies as a whole are designed to examine 
how individuals come to remember events that never actually happened to them. This 
particular study varied the types of details that were contained in photographs; each 
participant had an equal opportunity to be assigned to one of four conditions that 
contained different types of details. 
 
This line of research has important implications in areas where photographs and other 
suggestive tools are used to assist in the recovery of long-forgotten memories, such as in 
therapy, law enforcement, and judicial settings. 
 
Thank you for taking part. We would really appreciate if you would refrain from 
discussing this study with anyone. We plan to collect data over an extended period of 
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time, and it would be a problem if people coming to the study were aware of what we are 
studying.  
 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Joanna Hessen-Kayfitz, 
the principal investigator, at hessen@uwindsor.ca, or Dr. Alan Scoboria, the faculty 
supervisor, at scoboria@uwindsor.ca, or at 253-3000 ext. 4090. 
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Appendix H – Consent for use of data post-debriefing 
 
 
 
  
Research Subject Name:    
 
Title of the Project: Remembering Childhood Events 
 
Now that I am fully informed about the true nature and intent of 
this study, I consent to the subsequent use of the data obtained from the 
above-listed study. 
 
I understand this is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my 
data at any time. I also understand that my name or will not be revealed to 
anyone and that all information obtained will be kept confidential. Data 
are filed by number only and store in a locked cabinet. 
 
I understand that confidentiality will be respected and the viewing of 
materials will be for professional use only. 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
        (Research Subject)                                                       Date     
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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Appendix I - ABMQ 
CHILDHOOD EVENT INVENTORY 
Below are some events that may or may not happen to people before the age of 6. Please 
answer four questions about each event. 
The first question has to do with how plausible it is that events like this happen to people in 
general. The second question asks how plausible it is that events like this could have happened 
to you. There are many events that may happen to some people in general but are not plausible 
for you (e.g. it is very plausible that many people got stung by a hornet when they were younger, 
regardless of whether they remember it; however, you may have grown up in an area of the world 
with no hornets and so it is unlikely that this could have happened to you, whether or not it did).  
Also, many things happen that people do not remember having happened. People can know 
something happened to them, without remembering the event (for example, you probably know 
where you were born, even though you don?? remember being born). Therefore, the third question 
asks your belief as to whether you think the event happened to you while the fourth question asks 
whether you actually remember this event.  
Lastly, please keep in mind that all the following events ask questions about events that happen 
at or before the age of 6. 
 
 
Event 1.  
 
Choking on a small object, at or before the age of 6. 
 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, choke on a small 
object? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible  
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have choked on a 
small object?  
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact choke on a small 
object?  
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
 
D. Do you actually remember choking on a small object before you were the age of 6?  
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and complete 
                                                                                                                               memory of event 
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Event 2.  
True Event experienced uniquely by a specific participant 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible  
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
 
D. Do you actually remember [INSERT EVENT] before you were the age of 6?  
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and complete 
                                                                                                                               memory of event 
Event 3. 
Going on a hot-air balloon ride, at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, go on a hot-air balloon 
ride? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible  
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have gone on a hot-air 
balloon ride?  
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact go on a hot-air 
balloon ride?  
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
 
D. Do you actually remember going on a hot-air balloon ride before you were the age of 6?  
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and complete 
                                                                                                                               memory of event 
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Event 4.  
 
Receiving a bone density screening, at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, receive a bone density 
screening? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible  
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have received a bone 
density screening?  
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact receive a bone 
density screening?  
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
 
D. Do you actually remember receiving a bone density screening before you were the age 
of 6?  
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and complete 
                                                                                                                             memory of event 
Event 5.  
 
Seeing a UFO at or before the age of 6. 
 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, see a UFO? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible  
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have seen a UFO?  
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact see a UFO?  
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
 
D. Do you actually remember seeing a UFO before you were the age of 6?  
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and complete 
                                                                                                                               memory of event 
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Appendix J – Memory Characteristics Questions 
 
On a 7-point scale (1 = low, 7 = high), please rate to what extent the following 
statements apply to you. 
 
1) You were able to relive the event in your mind 
2) You were able to see the event in your mind 
3) You were able to hear the event in your mind 
4) You were able to feel emotions associated with the event 
5) You remember the event rather than just know that it happened 
6) You remember the event as a coherent story 
7) You believe the event occurred in the way remembered 
8) You had talked/thought about the event in the past 
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Appendix K – Demographic Questions 
 
1. What is your gender? 
2. What is your date of birth 
3. Do you live with your parents 
4. How long have you lived in Windsor 
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